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Engineering the Modern Administrative State: 
Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the 
New Deal Era* 
Daniel B. Rodriguez** 
Barry R. Weingast*** 
Administrative constitutionalism in the United States has 
been characterized by tension and accommodation. The tension 
reflects the unsettled nature of our constitutional scheme, 
especially with regard to separation of powers, and also the 
concern with agency discretion and performance. Still and all, we 
have accommodated administrative constitutionalism in 
fundamental ways, through a constitutional jurisprudence that, 
in the main, accepts broad delegations of regulatory power to the 
bureaucracy and an administrative law that oversees agency 
actions under procedural and substantive guidelines. This was 
not always the case. In this Article, part one of a larger project, we 
revisit the critical New Deal period to look at the strategies the 
Congress and the Supreme Court used to resolve controversies 
over the emerging administrative state. We see the political and 
legal accommodation as a product of a (mostly) coherent 
interbranch dialogue, iterative and fueled by strategy. Having 
surmounted some important roadblocks in the first New Deal, this 
effort ultimately resulted in a scheme that enabled the federal 
government to accomplish their three critical objectives: to deploy 
national power to solve new economic problems, to create 
delegations appropriate to modern needs, and to craft novel 
administrative instruments to carry out legislative aims—all of 
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School of Law, Stanford Law School, and Cornell Law School. 
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which required a due amount of legal accommodation, given 
extant legal doctrine and the interests of the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The long-standing issue of how the modern administrative state 
emerged from the Sturm und Drang of politics on the one hand and 
the complex architecture of traditional legal doctrine on the other 
remains a central question for public law scholarship.1 Many of our 
 
 1. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014); 1 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, at 216 (1st reprtg. 1992); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13–32 (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
(1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Mark Tushnet, 
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1565 (2011); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the 
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Laura Kalman, Law, 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
149 Engineering the Modern Administrative State 
 149 
 
leading legal historians have turned their great talents to this 
question.2 Standard wisdom notwithstanding, we revisit this 
perennial topic in part because no consensus exists as to how to 
answer this question.3 
The standard wisdom about the major legal controversies of the 
New Deal separates constitutional law issues from administrative 
law issues into two non-overlapping categories, like two silos that 
operate with complete independence. This separation in part 
reflects the notion that the foundation of administrative law is 
statutory, not constitutional; hence administrative law lies outside  
the constitutional domain. We argue that this separation is artificial 
and misleading. 
This separation causes both constitutional law scholars and 
administrative law scholars to miss important aspects of the legal 
controversies from Crowell v. Benson (1932) through the New Deal—
namely, the necessity of invention, of establishing a new, routine 
process for issuing sovereign commands via administration. As of 
January 1, 1930, this process did not exist. By WWII it was solidly 
 
Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time 
and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1891 (1994). 
 2. In addition to sources cited in supra note 1, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT 
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). Moreover, the 
primary and secondary questions in this vein appear with more or less prominence in books 
and articles that focus on contemporary legal doctrine. For example, Gillian Metzger’s recent 
Harvard Foreword recurs to the New Deal period to articulate anew the case for a well-
fortified consensus view of the durability of administrative constitutionalism. Gillian E. 
Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). Calling 
the administrative state “constitutionally obligatory,” she notes that these legislative 
delegations of power to agencies “are here to stay.” Id. at 72. To be sure, the modern literature 
does not want for full-throated critiques of the administrative state, looking with particular 
ire at the world wrought by the New Deal’s accommodation to broad administrative power. 
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); D.A. Candeub, 
Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (2017); Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous 
Position of the Rule of Law and the Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2013). 
However, the constitutional objections have largely been resolved in favor of administrative 
constitutionalism, and there is little reason to believe that even the most vigorous 
contemporary attacks on the “dark state” will unwind this situation. See Adrian Vermeule, 
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2465 n.3 (2017) (comparing administrative state skepticism to “believing in UFOs or 
watching dystopian movies”); see also EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING 
POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The 
Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2018). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 26–42. 
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in place. Part of the question was how, if at all, the rule of law was 
to be extended to administrative regulation. We argue that a major 
part of the controversy between the Supreme Court and the New 
Deal was a negotiation, even if tacit, over this issue—the 
framework for extending constitutional rights of due process. The 
constitutional solution was the invention of procedural due 
process, which emerged from tacit negotiations between elected 
officials and the courts. Indeed, the solution emerged from an 
implicit political accommodation (or an “implicit contract,” to use 
law and economics terminology) whereby political officials 
retained control over the content of regulation while courts ensured 
that the administrative process met conditions of due process, 
which came to have a procedural basis. 
We launch our argument with the “internalists,” the scholars 
who emphasize the doctrinal elements of these constitutional 
controversies, rather than the political considerations. We agree 
with their criticism of the standard wisdom, arguing that 
traditional externalist scholarship of the New Deal fails to account 
for the changing nature of the issues over the course of the New 
Deal. Put simply, the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are very 
different statutes, raising different issues and therefore prompting 
a different reaction by the courts. Instead of seeing Jones & Laughlin 
Steel4 as a capitulation, they argue that the issues had changed. 
We nonetheless depart from the revisionists in three ways. They 
miss, first, the necessity for the New Deal to invent a new basis for 
administrative law that both the courts and elected officials qua 
New Dealers could accept. Second, the dialogic nature of the 
evolution of doctrine and legislative practice. Third, the deep 
connection between the constitutional settlements of the New Deal 
and administrative law. 
To begin, our argument has five steps: 
First, we focus on the Crowell decision in 1932.5 This case is one 
of the foundational stones in the administrative law edifice: 
regulatory agency rulings have the force of law, so long as an 
Article III court has the authority to oversee the regulatory process. 
A necessary condition for building the American administrative 
 
 4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 5. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
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state, this decision reveals how formless and inchoate 
administrative law was on the eve of the New Deal. 
Second, early New Dealers explicitly ignored constitutional 
issues, to their detriment.6 The NIRA proved a dual failure with the 
Court. Proponents of the standard wisdom miss both aspects of this 
failure: (i) an absence of any attempt to adopt any of the 
constitutional prescriptions involved in prior regulatory legislation 
approved by courts, and (ii) the absence of any credible attempt to 
protect citizens from abuse of their rights by the National 
Recovery Administration. 
Third, with respect to the early New Deal cases, notably 
Schechter Poultry (1935)7 and Panama Refining (1935),8 the standard 
wisdom fails to provide an adequate account of the Court’s 
opinion. True, the Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional. 
But Panama Refining and especially Schechter Poultry did far more. 
They articulated a “how-to manual” of sorts—that is, a set of 
instructions for Congress to follow in order to ensure that 
administrative discretion would be properly cabined and channeled. 
These requirements were a quid pro quo for constitutional validity, 
even if this point was made tacitly, not explicitly. 
Fourth, the NLRA became the absolutely pivotal event in the 
creation of administrative law during the New Deal. This act was 
not just another New Deal statute of the first-100-days ilk, but  
a regulatory statute unlike any before it. It became the model  
for administrative regulation based on procedural due process. 
Importantly from our perspective, the Act met the Court’s 
prescriptions of the “how-to manual” by detailing a set of elaborate 
procedures for the agency to follow in order to implement  
public policy. 
Fifth, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the NLRA in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel was not a capitulation, as the standard wisdom holds, 
but an affirmation. A comparison of the portions of Schechter 
Poultry ignored by the conventional explanation with Chief Justice 
Hughes’s opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel demonstrates that he is 
not articulating a new principle, as the “switch in time” standard 
wisdom holds. Chief Justice Hughes not only declares the NLRA 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 145–47. 
 7. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 8. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
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constitutional, but he explains to Congress that they got it right; 
Hughes approves of the Act because it meets the strictures of the 
“how-to manual,” which he then repeats.9 We therefore see a 
dialogue between the Court and Congress. Congress writes 
legislation in the first 100 days without regard to constitutional 
issues, notably in NIRA. The Court not only rules this Act 
unconstitutional, but it develops at length the “how-to manual.” 
Congressional drafters of the next round of legislation work hard 
to structure the NLRA based on past precedent. When the Court 
issues Schechter Poultry, we see that the NLRA drafters anticipated 
most of the “how-to manual.” The Supreme Court then approves 
in Jones & Laughlin Steel. 
The standard wisdom in constitutional law, dominant for 
eighty years, relies too heavily on President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
view, a view developed for political purposes and therefore one 
that we need to treat skeptically. The triumph of the New Deal did 
not result from the bulldozing of a defenseless Supreme Court by 
the lions. Instead, it was at once a political accommodation of the 
elected and judicial branches that to this day dominates how the 
nation evaluates regulatory decision-making. It is the model statute 
of procedural due process. 
The political accommodation involved two constitutional 
aspects, one widely recognized, the other utterly unrecognized. The 
portion largely recognized involves the Commerce Clause. Per the 
standard story, the Court considerably relaxed the constraints 
imposed by the Commerce Clause on national government 
regulation in Jones & Laughlin Steel. Prior to that case, Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence was a mess. Different cases emphasized 
different tests, seeming to produce contradictory results. In Jones & 
Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court clarified and systematized 
Commerce Clause doctrine, choosing the most permissive of the 
previous tests. 
The second and largely unrecognized aspect of the political 
accommodation involved the Courts’ acceptance that 
administrative law would have a statutory, not constitutional basis. 
We see this basis in the “how-to manual,” in the Court’s acceptance 
of the NLRA in Jones & Laughlin Steel, and in the landmark 
 
 9. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31. See generally infra text accompanying  
notes 189–92.  
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Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. In principle, the Court could 
have articulated a constitutional basis for administrative 
procedures, affording it a stronger hand in protecting citizen rights. 
But the Court chose not to do so. Leading administrative law 
scholars, including Adrian Vermeule in his important recent book, 
Law’s Abnegation, interprets this choice of statutory basis as part of 
the courts’ internally driven abnegation.10 Our argument suggests 
otherwise. This statutory basis for administrative law is a central 
component of the political accommodation on granting political 
officials the means to control regulatory policy while the courts 
enforce a system of procedural due process. 
We focus here as well on the administrative law that emerged 
from the New Deal, this accompanying the Court’s blockbuster 
constitutional decisions. The literature lacks a compelling and 
unified story that ties together the so-called New Deal revolution 
in federal power and administrative constitutionalism with the 
emergence of meaningful administrative law in the 1930s and 
1940s. Instead, we have two more or less separate narratives, one 
focusing on the constitutional law struggles over the scope of the 
commerce power and the nondelegation doctrine, and the other 
focusing on the newly emerging administrative law, even though 
the two sets of events were unfolding simultaneously as part of a 
single political process.11  
The conventional constitutional law narrative takes us from the 
skepticism of pre–New Deal conservative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to the stark rejection of legislative delegation 
reflected in the NIRA and then to the remarkable events of  
1936–37, where the Court appears to shift course suddenly, from a 
 
 10. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016). 
 11. We say “newly emerging” advisably, given what we know to be important 
elements of administrative law that happened before—in some respects, long before—the 
New Deal period. Jerry Mashaw’s magisterial work on administrative regulation during the 
founding period is a useful and compelling antidote to the notion that administrative law 
was invented in the 1930s. JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: 
THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). Still and all, we 
regard the 1930s as a seminal epoch in the development of both regulatory administration 
and administrative law. In this we agree with many administrative law scholars, perhaps 
beginning with Freund, continuing with Frankfurter, Landis, and other exponents of an 
expanded form of administrative regulation, and continuing to scholars of the present day. 
See HORWITZ, supra note 1. 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
154 
 
stubborn rejection to an unequivocal embrace of New Deal 
regulatory power.12 
The administrative law narrative is more opaque. 
Administrative agencies, emerging during the Progressive Era,13 
grow in substance and in prominence in the 1930s. A long series of 
questions confronted the Supreme Court concerning the 
appropriate scope of agency power. This confrontation arose at 
multiple levels, including separation of powers, of fidelity to rules 
of fair agency procedure, and the scope of administrative agency 
power to find facts, apply law to facts, and interpret statutes. In 
many ways, the signal case in this emerging New Deal 
administrative law is Crowell v. Benson (1932)14 decided on the eve 
of the New Deal, where the Court took a major step in favor of 
administrative power.15 Other linchpins of the modern 
 
 12. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 73 (1941) (concluding 
that “the outcome of the election of 1936” was important “in inducing the Justices . . . to 
restudy their position”); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND 
HIS LEGACY 223 (1995) (explaining that the Court “beat[] a strategic retreat . . . largely in 
response to the Court-packing plan”); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME 
COURT 117 (6th ed. 2016) (stating that “it is hard to doubt that” FDR’s landslide victory in 
the 1936 presidential election and his court-packing scheme “played a part in the new tone 
of judicial decision that began to be sounded in the early months of” 1937); CARL B. SWISHER, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1943); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942); ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 342–43 (suggesting that 
the Court in 1937 “eliminate[d] the risk of hostile Article Five amendment by unequivocally 
recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government”); 
Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, reprinted in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 11–12 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. 
Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (citing the 1937 “switch” as an example of how 
courts “legitimate the changes” in “the nature of the social compact”); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin 
M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010) (empirical analysis 
of Justice Roberts’s move leftward during the 1936 Term); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1057–58 (2000) 
[hereinafter Friedman, Countermajoritarian] (noting that the New Deal was a “time[] in 
history . . . when politics appeared to influence the Court, and may well have done so”); 
Friedman, supra note 1. For a good survey of some of the more recent literature, see Barry 
Cushman, The Jurisprudence of the Hughes Court: The Recent Literature, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1929 (2014). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42 (1991) (“[A]ll 
lawyers recognize that the 1930s mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist 
national government.”). 
 13. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION 
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 126–31 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986). 
 14. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 15. See VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 25–29 (describing Crowell as a “sweeping attempt 
to mediate the conflict between law and the administrative state in general terms”). 
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administrative state include Schechter Poultry v. United States,16 St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,17 Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery,18 and the Morgan cases.19 In all these cases, 
Schechter Poultry included, the Court put forth standards for 
agencies to follow to ensure fidelity to an emerging conception of 
the rule of law in the administrative law.20 This era, beginning with 
the New Deal and continuing to the enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) just fourteen years later,21 
defined for the years to come the acceptable nature and scope of 
administrative power under our American constitutional scheme.22 
Seldom do scholars focus on the ways that these two lines of 
precedent come together, and rare is the book or article that 
endeavors to connect the blockbuster constitutional law 
movements of the New Deal period—what scholars from Edward 
Corwin23 to William Leuchtenburg24 to Bruce Ackerman25 call a 
“constitutional revolution”—with the birth of modern 
administrative law. Yet, understanding the connections between 
New Deal constitutionalism and administrative law are essential to 
a deeper and broader understanding for the ways in which the 
courts, Congress, and the President worked to develop a structure 
 
 16. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 17. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). 
 18. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 19. These refer to four cases decided by the Supreme Court within a half-decade. See 
Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 
304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v. Morgan (Morgan III), 307 U.S. 183 (1939); United States v. 
Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941). 
 20. Cutting matters off at the time of the APA is, to be sure, somewhat arbitrary. While 
we do not focus closely on post-APA developments in this paper, we do note that some of 
the more significant steps toward a “fair procedure” model of administrative law are the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), and other 
cases related to the standards of significant evidence and the meaning of on-the-record 
proceedings. In the next part of this project, we will turn to these and other bellwether cases 
and illuminating steps in the development of post–New Deal administrative law. 
 21. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). On the 
origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). 
 22. As Ernst summarizes this development: “Administrators exercised great 
discretionary power but only if they treated individuals fairly and kept within limits 
imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” ERNST, supra note 1, at 7. 
 23. See CORWIN, supra note 12, at 64. 
 24. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 2, at 213. 
 25. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 352–53. 
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of regulatory administration suited to the difficult economic and 
social problems that would come to characterize modern industrial 
society. Putting these political episodes and doctrinal 
developments into two separate boxes, one for constitutional 
historians and scholars and the other for the intrepid group of 
administrative law scholars has been counterproductive. Instead, 
we need to integrate these two separate stories. We explain how 
politics and law factored in the emergence of a novel approach to 
regulatory administration.  In its novelty, key constitutional 
controversies arose. And it was in the settling of these 
controversies, settlement which required both political and 
doctrinal interventions, that the modern administrative state  
was created. 
Looking anew at this critical period in American legal 
development, we advance a thesis that navigates between the 
conventional externalist story and the internalist, court-centric 
story of public law’s origins and impact during and after this era. 
The first story sees the ratification of broad congressional power 
under the Constitution as a concession to external political 
pressure—an idea captured memorably in the phrase “a switch in 
time saved nine.”26 In this account, administrative power in the 
latter New Deal period and afterward was more or less inevitable; 
it followed in due course from the Court’s caving in to political 
influence, a surrender that explains, too, the steady rise of 
administrative agency power and impact in the post-War period. 
This approach sees the epoch as a pitched battle between two views 
of American constitutionalism and administrative discretion and, 
thanks largely to the intervention of President Roosevelt and the 
defanging of the conservative resistance in the wake of these wave 
elections in 1932 and especially 1936, the winners enjoyed the 
spoils.27 Needless to say, this story is abidingly zero-sum: Will the 
Court triumph in forestalling the New Deal? Or will FDR and his 
progressive vision of a society prevail? 
 
 26. The switch in the voting of one justice turned a 5-4 majority against the New Deal 
into a 5-4 majority in favor of the New Deal, thereby forestalling FDR’s threat to pack the 
Supreme Court. The quotation is associated with Professor Thomas Reed Powell. On 
Powell’s contemporaneous evaluation of the Court in this era, see John Braeman, Thomas 
Reed Powell on the Roosevelt Court, 5 CONST. COMMENT 143, 183 (1988). 
 27. For a contemporaneous, if somewhat breathless, depiction of this era that reflects 
a strong externalist perspective, see CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE: A 
STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1947). 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
157 Engineering the Modern Administrative State 
 157 
 
The other story, sometimes called revisionist, is of more recent 
origins and, while less influential, does provide a different account 
of the Court’s decision making in the key constitutional cases. 
Richard Friedman28 and Barry Cushman29 propound a thesis that 
can fairly be seen as internalist,30 that is, as insisting that the Court’s 
decisions upholding in some circumstances federal authority under 
the Commerce Clause, then famously in the cases involving the 
NIRA striking down federal legislation as unconstitutional 
delegations of legislative power, and then finally upholding the 
linchpin statutes of the New Deal, can largely be explained on 
doctrinal terms. This is not to say that external political factors were 
deemed irrelevant, but rather that it is a vast oversimplification to 
view these decisions as unmoored from doctrine and as merely 
political. From a doctrinal perspective, not all New Deal cases were 
alike. This observation provides the key to understanding the 
emergence of the political accommodation. 
By contrast, the story of administrative law’s emergence is 
sketchier. Yet, here too an internalist/externalist dichotomy 
persists. For prominent administrative law scholars looking back at 
this period, including Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis, as well 
as contemporary legal scholars,31 the solutions to the difficult 
problems of administrative discretion lie in nuanced legal doctrine, 
building on, but not limited to, the fundamental architecture of the 
APA.32 Judicial review would be the answer to the discretion 
 
 28. See Friedman, supra note 1. 
 29. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1; Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 
201 (1994). 
 30. Following the description by Kalman, supra note 1, at 2165–66, which she attributes 
to Cushman. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 3–7. The dueling accounts of the standard and 
revised stories have been described as “a divide that has long separated historians of the 
New Deal: internalists who emphasize gradual doctrinal evolution, and externalists who 
emphasize the causal power of dramatic political events.” Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for 
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 728 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra note 1). 
 31. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: 
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
12–18, 53–66 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification 
Critique of Judicial Review, 69 OHIO STATE L.J. 251 (2009). 
 32. This is the overarching theme of Professor Jaffe’s classic treatise. LOUIS L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). Professor Davis’s comprehensive, 
albeit eccentric, treatise also valorizes the capacity of judges to supervise administrative 
agencies, thereby properly channeling and limiting administrative discretion. See 1 KENNETH 
C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978); 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
158 
 
conundrum; and this doctrine, viewed principally as judge-made,33 
would emerge as mechanisms to control and channel 
administrative power. The externalist perspective looks more 
skeptically at the avowed autonomy of law and legal doctrine.34 It 
sees the answer to administrative discretion largely in political 
control and oversight.35 Presaging the Supreme Court’s opinions by 
four decades in seminal administrative law cases such as Vermont 
Yankee36 and State Farm,37 the idée fixe among externalists here is that 
agency discretion can be limited truly only by political 
interventions and structural limits.38 Administrative law, in this 
account, is essentially politics by other means.39 
We find neither the internalist nor externalist accounts of 
constitutional and administrative law a satisfactory rendering of 
the complicated political and legal episodes of that key era.40 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1979); see also KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES (1976). 
 33. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Law as Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113 (1998); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: Reflections on a Generation of Administrative 
Law Scholarship, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997). 
 34. For a skeptical view of the role and motivations of the courts in reviewing 
administrative agency decision-making, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE 
GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988). 
 35. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999). 
 36. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 37. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 38. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2005); Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
 39. Lest we exaggerate this divide among what we are calling internalists and 
externalists in administrative law, a growing number of influential administrative law 
scholars are negotiating the political and legal elements of administrative law and looking at 
multiple mechanisms for controlling agencies. Some of the most important of this work is 
empirical in focus, and from this work we learn much about the actual structure and strategy 
of administrative agency performance. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers,  
117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of 
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency 
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative 
State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form,  
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004). A classic early statement of this reconciliation between more 
internalist and externalist views is Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and 
Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV.  
1251 (1992). 
 40. Not that we are the first to undertake this effort. Ackerman characterized his effort 
as an effort to drop “the old and tired debate” between internalist and externalist 
perspectives. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 343; see Kalman, supra note 1, at 2165–66.  
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Politics mattered, but so too did law and legal doctrine. We argue 
that Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court engineered 
the modern administrative state through a political 
accommodation in which each institution accomplished important 
objectives, albeit unsteadily and with the challenges emerging from 
legal constraints and the yin and yang of political and legal 
strategy. The success of regulatory administration in the New Deal 
and post–New Deal eras required deft legislative and presidential 
strategy. But it also required substantial legal innovation, that is, 
the development and application of new legal rules and guidelines 
that would thread the needle of endorsing broad, novel federal 
regulation while also ensuring that agencies would recognize and 
respect the rule of law. To be sure, administrative constitutionalism 
was not created from scratch during the New Deal; nor was 
administrative law largely an invention of the Hughes Court.41 
However, the creation by Congress of new techniques for 
delegating administrative power along with new legal strategies to 
limit such power represented major advances. In just a few short 
years, we argue, the elements of modern administrative law 
emerged as a product of the mutual political accommodation 
engineered by Congress, the President, and the courts during the 
constitutional controversies. 
Our project here is to fill two lacunae in the extensive literature, 
one concerning some key doctrinal developments in both 
constitutional law and administrative law, the other concerning a 
theoretical explanation—forged through the application of positive 
political theory42—of the engineering of the administrative state. 
 
In addition to Ernst, cited above, we note Mark Tushnet and Cass Sunstein as fellow travelers 
along this road to deconstructing the internalist/externalist debate and looking anew at the 
New Deal and the emergence of a new administrative constitutionalism. See Tushnet, supra 
note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987). 
 41. See MASHAW, supra note 11; Rabin, supra note 13. 
 42. See, e.g., Rui DeFiguerido, Tonja Jacobi & Barry R. Weingast, The New Separation-
of-Powers Approach to American Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(Donald A. Wittman & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Pablo T. Spiller, A Positive 
Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law, or Regulatory 
Specificity, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1996); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory 
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994); William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, 
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In Part I, we set the table for our discussion of the New Deal 
struggle by focusing on the context—political and legal— which the 
Court faced as it considered key New Deal statutes, both in the first 
term of the Roosevelt administration—what is often labelled the 
“First New Deal”—and in cases beginning in the 1935 term. In Part 
II, we consider the Court’s constitutional analysis in two principal 
doctrinal areas—the nondelegation issue and the constitutionality 
of agency decision-making in the adjudicatory context. 
The concluding Part III explains how our thesis provides a 
meaningful new perspective on this well-trod subject, a perspective 
which helps us to better understand the political accommodation 
that undergirds the engineering of the modern administrative state. 
We also preview later work on this general subject. 
I. REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION AT THE CUSP OF THE NEW DEAL 
A comprehensive survey of the economic, social, and political 
history of the early twentieth century as relevant context for the 
emergence of regulatory administration is well beyond the scope of 
this article. Historical exegeses on this period have usefully set the 
table and the terms of the debate.43 What we can see clearly from 
the wide and deep historiography of the fifty years between the 
Progressive and New Deal eras is that our national political 
institutions, and especially Congress, worked deliberately, albeit 
with both successful and failed experiments, to craft appropriate 
administrative institutions to tackle the new and vexing problems 
that were arising in this rapidly changing nation. Fundamentally, 
the national government needed to expand its capacity to act 
effectively, and it needed to mobilize institutional strategies to 
carry out its developing objectives.44 To understand the political 
accommodation with respect to New Deal regulatory 
administration, we need to understand a bit about the predicament 
 
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to 
Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307 (1990); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. 
Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989). 
 43. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY (1990); HORWITZ, supra  
note 1; JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1982). 
 44. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 
(1991); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 57 (1975). 
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in both politics and law, and about the strategies emerging to tackle 
both systematically and simultaneously.45 
In this Part, we frame the basic strategic issues facing Congress 
and the courts respectively. For Congress (and also the President), 
the question was how to construct a proper regulatory apparatus 
which would function to solve key problems in economic 
regulation. Solutions would lie in new administrative techniques—
a new kind of bureaucracy. These strategies would build on key 
elements of the Progressive Era edifice, including the Interstate 
Commerce Act and its progeny, and also federal regulations in 
trade, food, and drugs. However, new problems called for 
imaginative new architecture. For the courts, the heart of the 
dilemma was how to reconcile these new regulatory innovations 
with constitutional doctrine, particularly with regard to the 
commerce power and separation of powers. 
A. The Emerging Administrative State and the Legal Landscape 
The burden of defining the scope and contours of federal 
regulatory administration fell squarely on the shoulders of 
Congress. Yet, key legislative decisions took place here, as before 
and after, in the shadow of judicial review. This insight is critical to 
any positive political theory of legislation; and, indeed, is common 
sense. Congress could push its agenda only so far as courts were 
willing to permit. 
The story of how the Court accommodated congressional 
assertions of power under the Commerce Clause is well known; it 
is featured prominently in the constitutional law casebooks and 
treatises and is commonplace in the scholarly literature on 
emerging federal regulation in the period between the Progressive 
Era of the late 19th century and the conclusion of the New Deal. 
Less attended to are the two questions which are central to 
congressional choices about the regulatory instruments it designed 
 
 45. While our analysis in this section does not represent a deep dive into the 
considerable historiography on law, economic development, and governmental capacity—
again, a task beyond the scope of this paper—we are conscious of the extraordinarily rich 
work of the most prominent legal historians who have valuably looked at the nexus between 
legal doctrine, legal theory, and economic conditions. See, e.g., J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND 
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1959); 2 MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (reprt. 1992); HORWITZ, 
supra note 1; Scheiber, supra note 44. 
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to implement federal economic and social policy during this era—
first, the limits, if any, on the scope of federal delegation of power; 
and, second, the bureaucracy’s power to make decisions in 
administrative adjudication. The Commerce Clause question is 
fundamentally different from these second two questions; the 
former implicates constitutional rules concerning federalism while 
the other concerns the Constitution’s separation of powers. 
1. Delegation of power 
Congress’s dilemma as it embarked on its task to regulate many 
parts of the economy in the pursuit of better market integration was 
how properly to structure legislative delegation. In one 
fundamental sense, that ship had sailed with the enactment of the 
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, for there Congress had given an 
independent agency, the new Interstate Commerce Commission, 
broad administrative authority to implement the charges of the Act. 
And while the federal courts may well have been, as James Ely, Jr., 
puts it, “dubious about an administrative body that was an 
uncertain fit in the constitutional system as traditionally 
understood,”46 no serious challenge was raised to Congress’s 
authority to enact the statute under the Constitution. Indeed, the 
central question of the constitutionality of creating these so-called 
independent agencies would await 1935, when the Court decided 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.47 
Nonetheless, the Court did indeed grapple with matters of 
constitutional power in the three decades between the turn of the 
century and the New Deal. In United States v. Grimaud,48 decided in 
1911, the Court upheld the provisions of a federal statute which 
delegated certain powers to the United States Forest Service. This 
was not, said the Court, a delegation of legislative authority—a 
decision which would raise concerns under the Constitution’s 
separation of powers, but the acceptable exercise of administrative 
authority under the executive power in Article I.49 As such, it was, 
 
 46. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012). 
 47. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 48. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
 49. See id. 
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as in Field v. Clark50 decided nearly two decades earlier, not an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. 
The Court’s most extensive treatment of the delegation issue 
came close to the New Deal era, when it decided J.W. Hampton, Jr., 
& Co. v. United States.51 The Court in 1928 considered the 
constitutionality of the Tariff Commission, an entity whose name is 
fairly self-explanatory in that it was created as part of a statute 
which accorded the President greater authority, acting through this 
commission, to levy tariffs in order to combat foreign powers’ 
efforts to impose costs on American products. Significantly, the 
Commission was obliged to follow a series of administrative 
procedures, including a version of what would become “notice-
and-comment rulemaking” in the APA enacted two decades later. 
In Hampton, the Court offers what to that time was the most 
comprehensive exegesis on the nature and scope of delegated 
legislative power. “Delegata potestas non potest delegari” (power may 
not be delegated), grandly declares the Court, noting that this 
maxim has force within the structure of our constitutional scheme 
of separation of powers.52 Legislative delegation of this sort is 
contemplated by our Constitutional system, for “Congress has 
found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive 
Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by 
its acts of legislation.”53 And it can do so “by vesting discretion in 
such officers.”54 
Critically, however, Congress cannot delegate to an 
administrative agency the discretion to make laws.55 The legislature 
must set out the appropriate standards, and the executive branch 
(here the Court accepting without much reasoning that the 
 
 50. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). In Field, the Court considered a delegation to 
the president to set tariffs under the McKinley Act. “That congress cannot delegate legislative 
power to the President,” said the Court, “is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”  
Id. at 692. However, this action by the President “was not the making of law,” but rather 
empowered the executive branch to serve as a “mere agent” of Congress. Id. at 693. 
 51. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 52. Id. at 405–06. 
 53. Id. at 406. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Earlier twentieth century cases in which the Court grappled with the question of 
proper constitutional delegation include United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); 
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); and Buttfield v. Stranahan,  
192 U.S. 470 (1904). 
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implementation of regulation is to be regarded as quintessentially 
an executive function under Article I) is limited to effectuating 
congressional purpose by executing these laws, a scheme of 
execution that is facilitated by a proper degree of discretion. The 
result turns on what the Court sees as basically a statutory fact, that 
is, that “this Act did not in any real sense invest the President with 
the power of legislation, because nothing involving the expediency 
or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of 
the President.”56 
Hampton is a strange animal. The Court’s acceptance of 
congressional action here does not turn in any real sense on a 
judgment about commerce power; nor does it really entail a firm 
elucidation of the separation of powers, that is, between what is a 
legislative versus an executive function. Rather, the Court waxes on 
about the extensive legislative guidance in the statute,57 about its 
policy goals,58 the rationale for delegation to the President and 
specifically to the Commission to effectuate these goals,59 the 
vitality of the procedures embodied in the statute to guide the 
Commission’s discretion,60 and, ultimately, its acceptance of the 
bargain struck by Congress to delegate significant regulatory 
authority to an administrative agency. Hampton reveals most 
clearly the Court’s judgment that the gravamen of the issue in these 
matters of regulatory choice of instruments and strategy is 
pragmatic and tethered to a vision of Congress as the play-caller or 
the composer—rather than, to mix up the metaphors a bit more, the 
quarterback or the orchestra conductor.61 
So far as constitutional delegation is concerned, the Court’s 
approach was rather formalistic and even somewhat circular.  
 
 56. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 410. 
 57. Id. at 404–05. 
 58. Id. at 413 (“Congress declares that one of its motives in fixing the rates of duty is 
so to fix them that they shall encourage the industries of this country in the competition with 
producers in other countries in the sale of goods in this country . . . .”). 
 59. Id. at 409 (“If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according to changing 
conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry 
out this purpose . . . .”). 
 60. Id. at 405 (“The Tariff Commission does not itself fix duties, but, before the 
President reaches a conclusion on the subject of investigation, the Tariff Commission must 
make an investigation, and in doing so must give notice to all parties interested and an 
opportunity to adduce evidence and to be heard.”). 
 61. See Chester F. Krizek, Administrative Law—Delegation of Powers—Constitutional 
Law, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 56 (1928). 
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That is, the matter of proper legislative delegation was considered 
through the lens of a constitutional ipse dixit: Did Congress 
delegate legislative power or simply authorize the executive branch 
to implement public policy through the use of Article I executive 
power? If the latter, the delegation was appropriate—and, 
moreover, the executive maintained significant power to supervise 
these executive officers. If the former, the delegation would be 
unconstitutional, as it would represent the surrendering of its core 
functions to a non-legislative entity. 
What remained critically uncertain, however, is how much 
guidance must Congress give to those entities who were exercising 
regulatory power under the rubric of the statute.62 The formalism 
of the Court’s “core functions” analysis obviated the need to 
consider this question carefully. And it would fall to the New Deal 
Court in the blockbuster trio of NIRA cases to resolve this 
question—a question necessary to answer in order for Congress to 
know how much flexibility it had in choosing the methods of 
regulatory structure and strategy. 
2. Administrative agency decision-making 
The relationship between courts and agencies in the years 
before the New Deal was, as legal historian Reuel Schiller notes, a 
“hodge-podge of different statutes and common law doctrines that 
could be used to challenge administrative actions.”63 In the main, 
administrative agency decision-making was cabined in important 
ways and what we have come to know as broad administrative 
discretion in agency fact-finding, to say nothing of rulemaking, was 
hardly known.64 This was principally the result of the federal 
courts’ rather strict demarcation of the line between what functions 
were properly for the federal courts and which functions could be 
delegated to agencies to adjudicate. 
 
 62. Adrian Vermeule gives a cogent summary of the dilemma arising out of the 
Court’s effort to synthesize the delegation view in Field, Grimaud, and Hampton. “[T]he whole 
problem of delegation,” he writes, “is to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.” 
VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 52. That is to say, how to ensure that the delegate acts “within 
the bounds of the statutory authorization” when that authorization is exceptionally broad or 
vague. Id. As Vermeule notes, in an understatement, “the dilemma continues.” Id. 
 63. Schiller, supra note 1, at 407. 
 64. “In the early decades of the modern administrative state, agencies typically 
proceeded not through rulemaking but through case-by-case adjudication . . . .” Sunstein & 
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1933. 
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The Supreme Court’s restrictions on agency rate-making 
authority, delineated just before the turn of the century in Smyth v. 
Ames,65 was one key mechanism of limiting administrative power. 
At issue in this case was whether state rate-making regulation of 
intra-state railroad shipments could set rates at confiscatory levels, 
forcing railroads to raise long-haul rates to remain in business. 
States therefore had incentives to set confiscatory prices, forcing 
railroads to raise prices elsewhere in the system. Of course, if every 
state did that, the regulatory environment would be mess. Smyth v. 
Ames held that  
a railroad company is entitled to exact such charges for 
transportation as will enable it, at all times, not only to pay 
operating expenses, but also to meet the interest regularly 
accruing upon all its outstanding obligations, and justify a 
dividend upon all its stock; and that to prohibit it from 
maintaining rates or charges for transportation adequate to all 
those ends will deprive it of its property without due process of 
law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws.66  
Further, “the company is entitled to ask . . . a fair return upon the 
value of that which it employs for the public convenience.”67  
The Court imposed additional restrictions in several other 
cases. For example, the Court’s insistence in its 1920 decision in 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough68 that, before any 
valuation decision was made in a rate-making proceeding, “the 
State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a 
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent 
judgment as to both law and facts.”69 
Through these doctrines, the Court maintained a strong grip on 
administrative agency power. Agency discretion would exist under 
the rubric of judicial oversight and, as noted in the earlier 
delegation cases, only as an outgrowth of executive power under a 
formalistic reading of Article I. 
This crabbed role of administrative agency function and 
discretion became the bête noire of New Deal–era legal scholars 
 
 65. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
 66. Id. at 543. 
 67. Id. at 547. 
 68. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). 
 69. Id. at 289. 
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who championed a more robust role for the bureaucracy. In his 
magnum opus, The Administrative Process, James Landis noted the 
flawed syllogism at the heart of the court-centric view of regulatory 
administration.70 “The insistence,” Landis writes, “that the 
administrative process . . . must be subject to judicial review is to be 
explained in part, I believe, by economic determinism. But the 
deeper answer lies in our traditional notions of ‘law’ as being rules 
administered and developed by courts.”71 Landis wrote in the 
midst of the New Deal reorientation of the relationship between 
agencies and courts; yet his focus included, especially, pre–New 
Deal cases in which (generally in the rate-making context) the 
courts rejected administrative agency fact-finding where such facts 
would determine the outcome in disputes, requiring de novo 
judicial review to ensure that the final legal decisions would accord 
with the rule of law as guaranteed by the courts qua courts. Landis 
saw, quite correctly, the success of New Deal administrative 
constitutionalism as requiring more discretion for agencies and 
thereby a more limited role for courts.72 
The connecting logic from legislative delegation to agency 
discretion in regard to fact-finding was the unsatisfactory and 
unstable distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. 
That is, the severe restrictions on agency decision-making were a 
reflection of a worldview in which agency actions were interstitial 
and in which the principal loci of power in the federal government 
was Congress in policymaking and courts in adjudication. New 
Deal progressives knew that the bright line was an unworkable one, 
however. For example, Landis notes J.L. Dickinson’s formulation in 
his 1927 treatise on administrative justice, quoting the long passage 
that begins with “[i]n truth the distinction between ‘questions of 
law’ and ‘questions of fact’ really gives little help in determining 
how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that there 
is no fixed distinction.”73 From this instability, Landis insists that 
agency discretion in adjudicatory decision-making must be 
 
 70. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 71. Id. at 134–35. See the discussion in HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 222–25. 
 72. And also, independence from the President is a key—as Adrian Vermeule 
describes it, the key—element of Landis’s argument for emboldened agency governance. 
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 2467–70. 
 73. LANDIS, supra note 70, at 145 (quoting JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927)). 
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broadened and, to the doctrinal point, must be unmoored from the 
narrow and formalistic approach characteristic of pre–New Deal 
administrative law.74 
The largely forgotten tussle over pre–New Deal agency 
adjudication reveals well the tensions that greeted New Deal 
reformers, in Congress and in the White House, as they grappled 
with solutions to growing problems of market integration, state 
capacity, and, of course, the Great Depression. Without a more 
robust scheme of agency adjudicatory authority, conflicts over the 
implementation of regulatory statutes would fall into the laps of 
courts, ill-suited by procedure (and perhaps also by temperament, 
given the times?) and limited by the impact they could hope to have 
through case-by-case dispute resolution. Greater use of rulemaking 
was the natural answer, to be sure; however, the legal foundation 
of the rulemaking revolution would await evolution in 
administrative structure, the enactment of the APA, and the 
constructive support of the federal courts in fashioning 
administrative law which facilitated this novel device for 
regulatory administration. In the first third of the twentieth 
century, the matter of agency authority through adjudication was 
critical and persistently complicated by old doctrines and 
separation of powers squeamishness. It would take bold actions by 
the Supreme Court, and a studied attention by a purposive 
Congress, to generate meaningful reform in the direction of more 
capacious administrative power. 
 
 74. Landis was not alone in this sentiment. Professor White describes Frankfurter’s 
sense of the issues at stake in the controversial growth of regulatory administration and 
agency power. Like Landis, he saw these issues grounded in emergent views of separation 
of powers. Indeed, as White writes, “[The] reframing of essentialist separation of powers 
jurisprudence was crucial, Frankfurter believed, to the development of administrative law.” 
WHITE, supra note 1, at 106. Legal historian William J. Novak highlights the career of Frank 
J. Goodnow and his work on administration, work which “laid the groundwork for the 
jurisprudential transition from nineteenth-century conceptions of the powers and duties of 
office-holders to modern administrative law.” William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the 
Modern Administrative State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249, 271 (Austin Sarat, 
Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002) (referring to FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911)). See also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 224–25 (describing the 
influence of Goodnow on pre–New Deal administrative law). 
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B. Unanswered Questions in the pre–New Deal Period 
As the regulatory bureaucracy came up to the New Deal, 
important new economic circumstances emerged. Congress faced a 
formidable challenge in creating mechanisms to address the new 
circumstances through administrative delegation. To fit under the 
commerce power of the Constitution’s Article I, Congress needed 
to convince the Court that the regulation of certain activities within 
a state would ensure the protection of commerce’s stream. There 
was, to be sure, support in the Court for this rationale, but the 
burden fell nonetheless on Congress to make the connection 
between its regulatory choices and the constitutional requisites. 
Further, the delegation issue under the Constitution looked fairly 
surmountable, as the Court had approved broad delegations, 
subject only to the condition that Congress not attempt to delegate 
its core lawmaking functions, thus going beyond what the 
Constitution’s separation of powers requires. Yet, the Court had yet 
to face the circumstance of a delegation so broad that the 
fundamental policy choices were made by government officials 
outside of the four corners of Congress. At bottom, the Court had 
still not squarely addressed the question of what standards and 
guidelines in the statute were absolutely necessary to ensure that 
the agency to which Congress had delegated broad regulatory 
authority was acting within the scope of the Constitution. So, as 
Congress would learn painfully, this question of precisely what ex 
ante statutory guardrails are required was not yet answered as the 
Seventy-Third Congress embarked on its bold New Deal tasks. 
Finally, the answer to the question of when and in what 
circumstances agencies could, in adjudication, find facts and reach 
determinations under the rubric of legislatively delegated authority 
was surprisingly elusive by 1932. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and other 
Progressive Era agencies enjoyed broad adjudicatory powers, 
including the power to set just and reasonable rates and to find that 
companies had engaged in unfair trade practices.75 However, these 
decisions were ubiquitously reviewable by federal courts and, as 
 
 75. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, § 1(24), repealed by ICC 
Termination Act of 1995, 5 Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 837 (“For the transportation of 
persons or property in carrying out the orders and directions of the President, just and 
reasonable rates shall be fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]”). 
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one case after another made clear, through de novo review. While 
such judicial oversight did not suffice to eradicate the worry of 
influential commentators, including Roscoe Pound76 and, in an 
earlier era, the great Oxford don, Albert Venn Dicey, writing in the 
1880s, that the bureaucracy would run amok,77 administrative 
discretion was steadily becoming hard-wired into our governance 
firmament. The looming question, which would be addressed 
meaningfully in lodestar cases during the 1930s and 40s, was  
how to balance the need for ever greater discretion with the 
Constitution’s demands for separation of powers and the rule  
of law. 
One final note before turning next to the New Deal: We should 
be wary of just embracing the simple observation that the Court’s 
reticence during the pre–New Deal period to put its rubber stamp 
on legislative delegation to agencies and to the expansion of 
administrative governance was the product of deep conservative 
impulse and agenda. True, judges and justices appointed by a long 
series of Republican presidents dominated the federal courts. And 
it is further true that prominent voices opposed the expanding 
bureaucracy. However, we should not overlook the fact that the 
acquiescence to, if not the exact endorsement of, national regulatory 
power is found in many instances in the legal doctrine of the period. 
Indeed, the federal courts had crossed a major bridge in declining 
to rule unconstitutional major instances of social and economic 
regulation, including the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act,78 the 
Federal Trade Act,79 the Railway Labor Act,80 and others. Without 
doubt, the major expansion of the federal government’s 
constitutional authority to regulate the economy would await the 
 
 76. On Dean Pound’s perspectives on the administrative state, see the comprehensive 
discussion in ERNST, supra note 1, at 107–38. See also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 218–19. 
 77. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(8th ed. 1915) (describing the tension between administrative agency decision-making and 
rule-of-law values). 
 78. See Theodore W. Ruger, Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (1938), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-
business-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/drug-and-cosmetic (last visited Oct. 12, 
2020) (“Throughout its long history the FDCA has been relatively secure from serious 
constitutional challenge, primarily because the statute regulates only products that  
are ‘in interstate commerce’ and thus comfortably within Congress’s Commerce  
Clause authority.”). 
 79. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). 
 80. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). 
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canonical cases of the New Deal era, some of which we will discuss 
in the next Part. But we should not exaggerate, with the hyperbole 
often accorded to the “four Horsemen” of the pre–New Deal Court, 
the conservatism of the Court’s approach to the bureaucracy in the 
period leading up to the New Deal. The evidence suggests that the 
story is considerably more complex and not reducible to a purely 
internalist or externalist explanation. 
Nor should we neglect the fact, as we will discuss further in the 
remainder of this Article, that the judiciary has institutional 
interests that go beyond merely instantiating ideological 
preferences. Much of the Court’s reticence to go all in on 
bureaucratic discretion, including before, during, and after the 
New Deal, stems from the reluctance to abdicate power. This 
reluctance is independent of ideological commitments, and we see 
it manifest in relevant forms and fashions in the Court’s decisions 
involving regulatory agencies. Landis and Frankfurter well 
understood this and, more than others, saw the struggle as going 
beyond a left/right divide. They saw it as a conflict between two 
critical, and stubborn, institutions, each configured to check one 
another, and, in that, each invested in maintaining significant, 
durable institutional power. Indeed, the thesis of this Article is that 
both Congress and the courts worked deliberately and strategically, 
and ever conscious of the actions and motivations of one another, 
toward a political accommodation, one which would ensure that 
the modern administrative state would function meaningfully and 
efficaciously in order to address various new wicked problems, 
while also ensuring court supervision of agencies’ respect for 
citizen rights. 
II. ACCOMMODATING THE EMERGING ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:    
THE NEW DEAL SYNTHESIS 
“[T]he arc results from the law working itself pure. It is not 
that the law was overcome by external force. . . . The 
unfolding logic of deference in administrative state law 
represents, not a triumph of state force over reason, but a 
flowering of reason.”81 
 
 81. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 24. 
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The conventional view sees the New Deal relationship between 
elected officials and the Supreme Court as a zero-sum game: the 
central question was, would the Supreme Court acquiesce or fight 
the New Deal? This approach divides the period into two parts: 
First, the Court slams Congress and the President by invalidating 
key pieces of the New Deal agenda. These bold judicial decisions 
put the new administrative state in peril.82 Less than two years later, 
with overwhelming support of the people manifest in the elections 
of 1936, an emboldened President Roosevelt threatened to pack the 
Court. The Court, in response, retreated from its approach and 
proceeded in one case after another to uphold New Deal legislation 
against constitutional challenge.83 With this retreat, the essence of 
modern regulatory administration is ensured, and, per the zero-
sum assumption underlying this view, the war is won. In a similar 
vein, commentators see the Court’s embrace of agency adjudicatory 
power in Crowell as a decisive victory for administrative power.84 It 
vindicates Landis’s view that agency decision-making must be 
freed from the shackles of pre-modern constitutionalism and of 
presidential politics.85 New Deal decisions by the Hughes Court are 
key to both of these explanations; and, although the mechanisms 
are fundamentally distinct, they are key as well to the more 
internalist explanations. 
The reality, we suggest, is a good deal more complicated. A 
thorough explanation requires more nuance than that provided by 
either of these black-and-white, zero-sum views. The externalist 
view is woefully undertheorized, lacking an explicit theory of 
 
 82. As Professor Bruce Ackerman views the matter, these decisions were the dying 
gasps of the “Old Court,” and its “continued war on the liberal welfare state.” ACKERMAN, 
supra note 1, at 337–38. Even among the externalists, this is an extreme view, one eliding the 
more complicated picture of commerce clause jurisprudence in the period between 1887 and 
1935. As Kalman wryly observes, Ackerman, in this rendering “has proven even more 
externalist than the externalists.” Kalman, supra note 1, at 2170. 
 83. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1. 
 84. But one which, on the face of the opinion, seemed to equivocate profoundly on the 
matter of administrative discretion, given the integral role it accorded to the judiciary in 
reviewing de novo jurisprudential and constitutional facts. Two prominent commentators at 
the time, both of which would do so much to advance the agenda of administrative 
constitutionalism, expressed grave concerns about Crowell at the time it was decided. As 
Schiller notes, “Crowell v. Benson became something of a bete noire [sic] for the proponents of 
prescriptive government.” Schiller, supra note 1, at 411–12 (summarizing the views of 
Dickinson and Frankfurter). 
 85. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 2466–70. 
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legislative-judicial relations,86 and, moreover, cannot explain the 
contours of the judicial doctrine in the relevant cases.87 And purely 
internalist explanations are wanting here, as elsewhere, in that they 
more or less ignore politics. How else are we to interpret the judicial 
skepticism first and the accommodation next? And how should we 
see the Court’s developing administrative law in pre-APA cases in 
light of the conditions of emergent administrative government and 
of political strategy? These questions cannot be answered by either 
of the rigid internalist and externalist views. 
That said, our claim is ultimately limited. We cannot reject 
whole cloth the assessment by generations of legal and political 
historians that the Court’s move to the Left in this space was 
influenced by decisions made and threatened by President 
Roosevelt; nor do we reject the revisionist view associated with the 
important new scholarship of Barry Cushman, Richard Friedman, 
and Daniel Ernst that the Court was fashioning their approach 
 
 86. Although, to be fair, Barry Friedman’s extensive elaboration of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in an articulated theory of judicial fidelity to politics is theoretically 
sophisticated, if incomplete. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). See generally Friedman, Countermajoritarian, supra note 12 (describing 
the flaws in the “externalist” account). Its incompleteness, which hopefully will become more 
clear as we discuss the Court-Congress dialogue in Section II.B, infra, is that it does not 
explain how the Court impacts congressional choices through strategic use of doctrine. While 
not here claiming that the PPT account is the only plausible theoretical model for explaining 
this dynamic relationship, it does highlight the importance of drawing a positive theoretical 
connection between what Congress and the Supreme Court have done and why they have 
done so. The political science literature on the relationship between law and politics, perhaps 
beginning with Corwin, has struggled with this challenge. See McNollgast, The Political-
Economy of Law, in LAW & ECONOMICS HANDBOOK VOL. 2, at 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and 
the Role of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY 273 (B. Weingast & D. 
Wittman eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory 
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994). And while this article is not the place to adumbrate the 
full value of a PPT account of the judicial-legislative dialogue, we feel confident in saying 
that a full picture of the mechanisms of legal change and adaptation requires attention  
to theory. 
 87. The most important empirical study of the “switch in time,” using sophisticated 
analytical methods, is by Daniel E. Ho and Kevin M. Quinn. Ho & Quinn, supra note 12.  
They conclude that Justice Roberts switched his vote, in that he moved suddenly leftward 
during the October 1936 Term. While congruent with the “externalist” thesis, this dense 
empirical paper does not express any sympathy (or lack of sympathy, for that matter) for the 
underlying political influence story. That is to say, accepting the fact of Roberts’s change in 
voting behavior is equally consistent with a view that indicates external influence as with 
the view that he was suddenly persuaded by arguments in this Term’s cases. We discuss the 
implications of Ho & Quinn for our analysis below. See infra note 177. 
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around emerging doctrinal categories and considerations. Rather, 
our aim is to contextualize the two central elements of 
administrative law jurisprudence of this era—delegation, and the 
adjudicatory authority of agencies—around a perspective that sees 
both Congress and the judiciary as focused on implementing their 
own objectives through strategic choices and under conditions  
of constraint. 
As we show, the interaction of the courts and elected officials in 
the New Deal was not zero sum, but positive sum: both sides had 
something to gain. And part of the acquiescence of the Supreme 
Court reflected the New Dealers’ acceptance of the Court’s 
conception of the requirements of due process, thereby maintaining 
the integrity of the judicial system and allowing the courts to police 
the government’s regulatory system. 
A. Legislative Ambitions and Strategies in the First New Deal 
The New Deal began with a flourish as the newly-elected 
Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his inaugural address that he 
was “prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the 
measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may 
require.”88 He went on to say that “[t]hese measures, or such other 
measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and 
wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring 
to speedy adoption.”89 
President Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress soon 
recognized that they needed to rely on the administrative state to 
help rescue the nation from the Great Depression.90 
The focus on the administrative state was borne of a steadily 
increasing confidence on the part of progressive scholars and 
public intellectuals that regulatory administration through a more 
imaginative use of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic power was 
 
 88. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt  
(Mar. 4, 1933). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF 
OUR TIME (2013); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN 
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945 (1999); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL 
LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES: 
AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION, 1920–1941 (1992); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,  
THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1935–1936 (1960). 
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important, and perhaps even essential, to the successful 
implementation of public policy.91 
The overwhelming vote of the American people for the 
Democratic Party in the 1932 election reflected a faith in the 
President and in Congress to establish instruments of governance 
appropriate to the conditions of economic and social life.92 These 
instruments emerged not only from political expediency, but also 
from a growing enthusiasm for the bureaucratic state and the utility 
of administrative agencies to implement legislative objectives and 
thereby steward the political near-consensus for an activist national 
government.93 Early in the development of New Deal regulatory 
strategy, a number of key regulatory agencies emerged as the 
template of legislative delegation and administrative expertise, 
including the National Labor Relations Board,94 the Securities & 
Exchange Commission,95 and the Federal Communications 
Commission.96 The essence of New Deal regulatory administration 
can be found in these three cornerstone agencies, and in the 
 
 91. Morton Horwitz summarizes the shift in focus and in strategy among liberal 
reformers: “As the Progressive disenchantment with the competence of courts to perform 
social engineering tasks combined with a loss of faith in the sensitivity of judges to questions 
of social justice, the effort to replace courts with administrative experts became more 
pronounced.” HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225. 
 92. On the significance of Roosevelt’s election of 1932 to the expansion of the 
administrative state, see Metzger, supra note 2, at 52 (“FDR’s election and enactment of the 
broad regulatory statutes of the New Deal thus was not a sudden move to administrative 
government, but it did represent a significant intensification.”). See also Novak, supra note 74. 
 93. This faith had its origins to some degree in the experimentations and insights of 
the Progressive Era, where Congress and the President worked in tandem to establish a more 
coherent conception of expertise and governance through administrative mechanisms. We 
agree with Adrian Vermeule that the juxtaposition famously drawn between the so-called 
classical Constitution and the new regulatory state is naïve. “The classical Constitution of 
separated powers,” writes Vermeule, “cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three 
branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state.” VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 46
(emphasis omitted).The seeds for twentieth century regulatory administration were indeed 
planted by our constitutional scheme of government. Still and all, the New Deal period is 
notable for its statutory innovations, and for its more fulsome grappling with the 
implications of expanding bureaucracies for the rule of law and the decision-making 
responsibilities and authorities of Congress and the President. It is through the New Deal 
and key judicial decisions that these issues began to be more systematically worked out. 
 94. See JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD:  
A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1933–1937 (1974). 
 95. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003). 
 96. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32589, THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 1 (2018). 
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regulatory apparatus they spawned. However, this strategic 
template did not come into the picture until a major legal snag was 
revealed and handled ultimately by the interaction of the Supreme 
Court with elected officials, negotiating a solution to the problem 
of the delegation of regulatory authority to bureaucratic agencies. 
The snag emerged with the implementation of the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) and the regulatory structure 
developed in the legislative centerpiece of FDR’s first hundred 
days, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).97 
When we look back at the controversy involving the NIRA, we 
need to understand the contours of presidential, congressional, and 
judicial interests and strategies. So far as President Roosevelt was 
concerned, we could plausibly view the NIRA as just a bold version 
of what presidents from Woodrow Wilson to the present had 
viewed as a strong executive implementing a Progressive vision of 
legislation and regulation. Before Landis’s magnum opus on the 
administrative state in 1938,98 influential Progressives, such as Felix 
Frankfurter, had already been explicating a muscular version of 
regulatory administration, molded by ambitious presidents and 
free from political turbulence.99 Likewise, Congress was steadily 
expanding the scope of regulation through blockbuster statutes 
going back two decades before the New Deal.100 Congress was  
a willing and critical ally in presidential tactics of expanding the 
national regulatory footprint. Indeed, Congress was anxious  
to craft novel regulatory strategies, as evidenced by its important 
efforts in the years just preceding the New Deal, including the 
statute that was the subject of the Court’s Crowell decision,  
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(LHWCA).101 And it worked quickly in the first Hundred Days  
of the Roosevelt administration, a period labelled the “First  
New Deal.”102 
 
 97. See infra text accompanying notes 114–21 (describing NIRA). 
 98. See LANDIS, supra note 70. 
 99. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930); Tushnet, supra 
note 1,  at 1568–76. 
 100. See supra Part I. 
 101. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (1927). 
 102. See KENNEDY, supra note 90, at 363–80. 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
177 Engineering the Modern Administrative State 
 177 
 
B. Courts, Congress, and the Dialogue 
What does the judiciary care about with regard to these 
evolving regulatory strategies? And how do they manifest their 
interests in their decisions? This question is critical for 
understanding the Supreme Court’s actions in this period of study. 
Yet it gets remarkably little attention. Recalling the dichotomy in 
the traditional literature, either the courts are viewed as mere 
reactors to political influence—essentially following the election 
returns, as Mr. Dooley quipped—or they are viewed as 
autonomous oracles, developing and applying doctrine.103 
The Court implemented meaningful legal strategies in its 
consideration of these novel regulatory mechanisms enacted via 
statute or administrative order. And it is important to look, first, at 
what the Court does and says; and, next, at why the justices decide 
the way they do. Broadly speaking, we see the Supreme Court as 
engaging in a dialogue with the legislature. In this dialogue, as 
viewed through the lens of PPT, neither branch truly has the last 
word.104 The dialogue is iterative and strategic and can be viewed, 
at least in a stylized sense, as a game involving two purposive 
actors, designing and implementing strategies in a system 
structured by certain rules and practices.105 
The judiciary’s strategies, as we will see as we consider these 
cases in more detail in the next section, reflected important 
concerns at two levels: First, they evidenced caution in exercises of 
congressional and presidential power, especially bold new 
initiatives. And, second, the Court was skeptical about the exercise 
of administrative power by agencies, and it therefore created an 
 
 103. In this latter, internalist account, we could see the Justices as acting as faithful 
agents to the rule of law, and doing best to implement legal principles or we could see the 
Justices as acting in accordance with their own ideologies, and using their opinions as a fig 
leaf to mask their true motives. This debate between the so-called attitudinalist model of 
judicial behavior and what has been called the legal model continues to rage. See generally 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (2002). We say nothing here by way of interrogating these two models; whether or 
not it is one or the other is not critical to the internalist explanation, at least as we consider it 
here. That said, Cushman and others pushing internalist explanations seem to accept that 
judges are acting as faithful agents, within the scope of rule of law constraints. 
 104. See DeFiguerido et al., supra note 42; see also Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial 
Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG.  
843 (2012). 
 105. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE 
POLITICAL THEORY (1973) (describing game theoretic account of Court-Congress relations). 
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approach that could be, and indeed was, viewed as intrusive  
and formalistic.  
Viewed through this lens, we might see, as the conventional 
wisdom of the “switch in time” emphasizes, the Supreme Court as 
distrusting of administrative agency power and just standing at the 
ready to strike down the efforts of a collaboratively leftist president 
and Congress to expand regulatory power. Yet this simplistic 
confrontation view, originating with FDR for his own political 
purposes, does not jibe with the evidence. Rather, the Court was 
reasonably deferential to administrative agency power in the years 
leading up to the New Deal. As White notes, “on the whole, the 
Supreme Court had been relatively receptive to federal agencies in 
the years between the [1906] Hepburn Act and the early 1930s.”106 
The situation with respect to administrative agency adjudication 
was, to be sure, more complicated. But the notion that the Supreme 
Court acted decisively in the period preceding Crowell and after the 
Second New Deal to rubber stamp agency decision-making is 
seriously misleading. 
The better assessment is that the dialogue between Congress, 
the Court, and administrative agencies continued apace in the years 
during and after the New Deal. No case was the last word, neither 
the lodestar cases upholding legislative delegations nor the cases 
deferring to administrative orders in adjudication. Rather, 
Congress took account of judicial directions about how best to 
create acceptable statutes; and courts maintained institutional 
power. As to the latter, it is important to see the judiciary as an 
institution with interests and objectives. Courts act with strategic 
purpose as do legislators, the President, and agencies. 
Moreover, the Court saw agency decision-making, particularly 
within the realm of adjudication (noting that rulemaking on a broad 
scale was still a fairly rare phenomenon at the time of the New 
Deal), as potentially in tension with the work of the judiciary and, 
perhaps even more critically, in a manner that looked rather alien 
to judges. “Judges,” notes Daniel Ernst, “readily assumed that 
norms of due process that had been worked out in the courts ought 
 
 106. WHITE, supra note 1, at 108. 
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also to govern the ‘quasi-adjudication’ of administrative agencies, 
and they condemned administrators who violated these norms.”107 
That the Supreme Court cared deeply about these issues was 
manifest in how it reviewed cases involving agency adjudication, 
as we will explore more fully in Section D of this Part. And it is of 
a piece with what we observe with respect to judicial decision-
making in a large swath of cases involving regulatory 
administration, including the prominent cases involving 
procedural due process in the 1970s and beyond108 and in the “hard 
look” cases of a later period in administrative law. As a bridge to 
our discussion of concrete judicial doctrine and strategy in the 
remainder of the paper, we here pull back the lens to say some more 
about the motivations and objectives of the Court in carrying its 
review function. 
First, judicial scrutiny of regulatory choices made by Congress 
through statute is very limited. Once federal authority to regulate 
under Article I is established, the courts have precious little basis to 
evaluate the techniques Congress employs to ensure that the 
bureaucracy will implement legislative objectives. Leaving aside 
the critical issue of whether or not Congress or the agency has 
violated the Constitution, the question of Congressional choice of 
regulatory instruments is essentially one of separation of powers. 
Has Congress intruded on a power reserved to another branch of 
government? In the context of the New Deal regulatory strategies 
of Congress, courts stood ready to protect the Constitution’s 
separation of powers through its responsibility to interpret the 
Constitution. So, one element of the Court-Congress dialogue—the 
Court’s protection of the separation of powers—emerges directly 
from our constitutional practice of judicial review. 
Second, courts care about their own sphere of authority and 
practice, and they look hard at whether and to what extent a 
regulatory schema, in design or in practice, impinges on the rule of 
law. This incentive cannot easily be captured in either an internalist 
or externalist perspective. That is, the Court’s protection of the rule 
of law is related to a sense of institutional responsibility to protect 
 
 107. ERNST, supra note 1, at 2. Ernst summarizes the compromise thusly: 
“Administrators exercised great discretionary power but only if they treated individuals 
fairly and kept within limits imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” Id. at 7. 
 108. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990). 
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rule of law values, a view that perhaps predates the Constitution 
but is certainly embedded in our conception of judicial power and 
limited government. Moreover, it is part of a cogent, purposive 
strategy of the Court to ensure that its critical role in governance is 
protected. We should understand the Court’s objectives as 
connected to rule of law fidelity in both of these senses and for both 
reasons described here. Of course, a major unanswered question in 
the first half of the twentieth century concerned how to extend the 
rule of law to the administrative state. 
Third, and finally, the Congress-Court dialogue is carried out 
in an environment in which neither institution truly has the last 
word. The Court can rule on the matter of a statute’s 
constitutionality and, if it holds that the statute violates the 
Constitution, Congress may take another bite at the policy apple by 
enacting a statute that cures these constitutional defects. And this 
effort is also subject to judicial scrutiny (to say nothing of judicial 
statutory interpretation). As we will explore in considerable detail 
below, Congress’s efforts as the first New Deal transitioned to the 
second New Deal period (1935–1936) were designed to meet the 
Court’s objections and therefore to overcome constitutional 
obstacles to Congress’s regulatory program. In contrast to the view 
of classic externalist scholars who see the New Deal decisions as 
more or less a product of the Justices’ ideologies, we see these key 
constitutional cases as part of an iterative dialogue, one involving 
three willful, strategically savvy institutions each concerned with 
not only the best interests of the nation but, as well, their own 
institutional interests and agendas. 
C. Commerce Power and Delegation: Congress in a Bind 
Faced with the Democratic Congress and President prepared to 
take bold steps to address the ills of the Great Depression, the 
Supreme Court would have to consider in the first years of the New 
Deal the question of whether congressional authority to regulate 
commerce in this way and the particular delegations of power to 
non-legislators was consistent with the Constitution.109 The claim 
made by the opponents of the centerpiece New Deal legislation was 
 
 109. The best treatment of these constitutional conflicts roughly contemporaneous with 
these events is found in Robert L. Stern’s The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,  
1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946). 
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that this legislation lacked adequate standards of policy to guide 
administrative discretion and therefore risked that agencies would 
not adhere to the rule of law. It was out of this collision of strategies 
and interests that the showdown involving the constitutionality of 
the NIRA arises. 
To understand the nature of this controversy, it is necessary to 
revisit the architecture of the NIRA; and, to do that, we must recur 
to the political landscape in which President Roosevelt and the 
Democratic Congress faced in focusing on this landmark piece of 
legislation. The ambition and novelty of the NIRA could hardly be 
overstated. Historian Barry Karl describes the act as “the result of a 
remarkable set of compromises” and views the legislative 
accomplishment in rather grand terms: 
As a piece of legislation, it was a blend of planning positions that 
had been debated for two decades. As an administrative program, 
it met the political demands of presidential management of the 
economy and, more important, the traditional public-works 
politics of Congress and the states. Its importance as a historical 
event is that it was the first significant American attempt to meet 
the critical needs of the industrialized world of the thirties.110 
At the same time, the process by which the NIRA was enacted 
was truncated, to say the least. Ira Katznelson notes that the NIRA 
“was almost entirely drafted, in detail, by the executive branch . . . 
[and] [was] passed virtually unchanged from the texts the 
president had sent to the Hill.”111 Drafters of the statute, certainly 
under the pressure of FDR, were resistant to suggestions to be more 
cautious and methodical,112 the result of which was a statute which 
was “[h]urriedly drafted and incautiously implemented”113 with 
“[p]oor attention to constitutional detail.”114 
If the sole issue was whether and to what extent Congress had 
the power under the Constitution to regulate commercial activity 
through this statutory mechanism, one devoted to industrial 
recovery, the harried nature of the process would not be fatal.  
The question of commerce power, after all, is a binary one; that is, 
 
 110. BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945,  
at 116 (1983). 
 111. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 123–24. 
 112. See PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 23–26 (1982). 
 113. ERNST, supra note 1,  at 6. 
 114. CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 38. 
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either Congress has the power to regulate commerce in this domain 
or it does not. In none of the key Commerce Clause cases before the 
New Deal did the Court’s decision turn squarely on the regulatory 
technique Congress deployed to carry out its regulatory strategy. 
And, indeed, sometimes Congress employed an agency (the ICC 
most famously, and the Railway Labor Board later), and other times 
it relied on the executive branch to implement its objectives (as in 
antitrust). The fundamental question was one of legislative power, 
not instrument design. 
Yet, the principal result of the NIRA’s careless drafting was that 
its structure and procedure was, to understate the matter, 
underdeveloped, a result that would prove fatal in litigation. The 
NIRA contained very few standards to guide administrative 
decision-making. Nor was the NRA directed to follow 
administrative procedures of any serious sort in implementing its 
charge.115 The absence of suitable safeguards and procedures, and 
also a requirement of evidence, represented a failure of drafting 
and of sensible appreciation for politics and the need for a political 
accommodation.116 Put another way, the federal government lacked 
the state capacity to make this form of regulation work. 
 
 115. The problems with the NIRA went beyond poor drafting, but also included rather 
weak lawyering on behalf of this novel statute. As Cushman notes, “the lawyers defending 
the NIRA had virtually no strategy,” and there appeared to be no real appreciation for the 
fact that this statute was enacted on a shaky constitutional basis. Id. For a valuable 
perspective from a leading New Dealer insider, see THOMAS EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER FOR 
THE NEW DEAL: AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 23–24 (1991). See generally 
PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 23–24 (1982); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 16 (1995). By contrast, opponents to this far-
reaching legislation were well organized and strategic. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 53–57 
(describing the efforts of the Liberty League and other organizations to mobilize against the 
New Deal); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 65 (“[B]usiness and economic conservatives were 
critical in developing the New Deal attack on the modern national administrative state.”). 
 116. These were problems as well with the Agricultural Adjustment Act. See generally 
MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR 119 
(2002) (“[T]he drafters [of the AAA] framed legislation that rested on vague constitutional 
theories and imprecise legal foundations.”). On the juxtaposition between the AAA and the 
NIRA, the former salvaged by congressional action, approved by the courts, and the latter 
an abject failure, Skocpol and Finegold wrote: 
  Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act 
created an extraordinary opportunity to extend government intervention into the 
economy. But, at the beginning of the Depression, no properly political learning 
had been going on to lay the basis for the NRA. Such learning as was going on in 
the 1920s about how to plan for industry was happening within particular 
industries, with trade association leaders doing the learning. When the federal 
government withdrew from even nominal control of industry after World War I, 
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Moreover, the statute delegated extraordinary powers to 
executive officials. Ira Katznelson summarizes the unique political 
process that accompanied the New Deal statutes of the first 
hundred days: 
[T]hese measures were characterized by immense powers 
delegated from the legislature to the executive branch that 
dramatically expanded the powers of federal agencies, many of 
which were new. . . . [T]he presidency . . . did gain extraordinary 
discretion under very broad and often not very well-specified 
emergency legislation.117 
Ultimately, it was the combination of these problems that 
proved problematic. The powers delegated were broad, and 
arguably “legislative” in nature; as scholars would later summarize 
the nondelegation doctrine, focusing on pre–New Deal cases as 
well as the NIRA cases, Congress was seen as having delegated its 
“core functions” to government officials outside of Congress. And, 
to make matters worse, there were neither any “intelligible 
principles” to guide administrative decision-making nor any 
procedures to give us confidence that these officials would exercise 
power responsibly. 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
NIRA first in Panama Refining v. Ryan.118 At issue here was the 
President’s power to approve and enforce codes of fair competition 
under Section 9(c) of the Act.119 Panama Refining challenged a code 
 
it left the field clear to the giant corporations and to the trade associations, whose 
efforts Hoover simply encouraged and attempted to coordinate, instead of 
building up independent governmental apparatuses. Thus, when the Depression 
struck and the New Deal found itself committed to the sponsorship of industrial 
planning, there was only the “analogue of war” to draw on—an invocation of the 
emergency mobilization practices used during World War I.  
  Government’s job in depression was much more difficult than in war: not just 
exhorting maximum production from industry but stimulating recovery and 
allocating burdens in a time of scarcity. 
 KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 64 (1995). 
 117. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 124. 
 118. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 119. As the relevant provision of the Act stated: 
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign 
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from 
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from 
storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any 
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.  
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applicable within the petroleum industry, one which was being 
used here to enforce bans on the sale of “hot oil,” that is, petroleum 
produced in excess of state quotas. The code did not require the 
President to make findings of fact before prosecuting businesses for 
violating its provisions. The Court struck down this provision on 
the grounds that it was tantamount to “uncontrolled legislative 
power” and thus represented an unconstitutional delegation under 
the Constitution.120 
Acknowledging that broad delegations to the President had 
been upheld in a number of decisions going back to the previous 
century, the Court viewed the delegation here as beyond the pale, 
given the absence of clearly delineated standards for the President 
to follow in implementing the statute and, as well, the absence of 
procedures, such as findings of fact, that the President would have 
to follow to carry out his regulatory responsibilities under Section 
9(c).121 “The Congress,” writes Chief Justice Hughes for the Court, 
“manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the 
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. 
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex 
conditions involving a host of details with which the national 
legislature cannot deal directly.”122 
The heart of the Court’s analysis came where it sought to 
balance its views about the unacceptable breadth of the delegation 
of power and the need for deference to congressional choices 
about administrative technique and expediency in regulation. The 
Court says: 
 
Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this 
subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for 
not to exceed six months, or both. 
Id. at 406. 
 120. Id. at 432. 
 121. Id. at 430. The Court then draws its principal conclusion after this long litany of 
cases upholding delegation within proscribed limits: 
  Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has 
recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional 
authority to transcend. We think that § 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the 
transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has 
declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is 
no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the 
transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.  
Id. 
 122. Id. at 421. 
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The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the 
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, 
which will enable it to perform its function in laying down 
policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected 
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within 
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the 
policy as declared by the [L]egislature is to apply. Without 
capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the 
anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances 
calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant 
recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and 
the wide range of administrative authority which has been 
developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the 
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional 
system is to be maintained.123 
The second principal challenge to the NIRA came in 1935, in 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,124 a challenge to New York 
City’s Live Poultry Code, a code enacted under the rubric of the 
NIRA. This case, unlike Panama Refining, represented a double-
barreled legal attack on the constitutionality of the statute, one 
barrel concerning the scope of the legislative delegation and the 
other concerning the scope of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause. As the Court held, the constitutional flaws in the relevant 
provisions of the Act stemmed from both sources. First, the NIRA 
was a hard sell under extant Commerce Clause doctrine. The case 
came up to the Court from a conviction of a local slaughterhouse 
operator, the Schechter Corporation, which had slaughtered 
poultry at its Brooklyn facility, then sold the poultry to local 
retailers for direct sale to consumers. There was no evidence of this 
chicken being sold in interstate commerce. This case was about as 
poor a vehicle with which to test the constitutionality of the statute 
as could be devised. A unanimous Court rejected the government’s 
strained argument that the statute could be applied against  
this defendant.125 
Yet the fact that this constitutional challenge comes up in a case 
where the constitutional case for federal legislation was weak, did 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 125. Id. at 499. 
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not spell the doom for the NIRA, since presumably there were other 
companies who did in fact engage in commerce across state lines.126 
The dagger in the NIRA came from the Court’s unanimous 
holding in Schechter Poultry that the NIRA represented an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.127 
Here the absence of adequate standards and of intelligible 
principles which would guide agency conduct proved fatal. “In 
providing for codes,” the Court announces, “the [NIRA] dispenses 
with this administrative procedure and with any administrative 
procedure of an analogous character.”128 The Court contrasts this 
statute with other regulatory statutes which had easily passed 
scrutiny, including the Federal Trade Commission. By contrast to 
these other statutes, Section 3 of NIRA “supplies no standards for 
any trade, industry or activity.”129 It concludes that “[s]uch a 
sweeping delegation of legislative power finds no support in the 
decisions upon which the Government especially relies.”130 This 
view was reinforced in Justice Cardozo’s remarkable concurring 
opinion, one in which he describes Section 3 of the NIRA as 
“delegation running riot.”131 
In the end, the poor statutory drafting and insufficient attention 
to constitutional principles as they had been considered in previous 
instances of regulation came back to haunt Congress and the 
President. The concerns that had been percolating among the 
judiciary, and in particular Chief Justice Hughes, about limitless 
administrative power overflowed in Schechter Poultry, as the Court 
unanimously looked with scorn at this haphazard statute and saw 
animate threats to the rule of law and the separation of powers.132 
 
 126. Nor did this holding disturb in any meaningful way the state of the Court’s 
commerce clause jurisprudence. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES 
EVAN HUGHES, 1930–1941, at 68 (2007); see also Cushman, supra note 11, at 1965 (“At the time, 
such an interpretation was thoroughly conventional.”). Indeed, Stern suggests that the 
commerce clause holding was unnecessary. Stern, supra note 109, at 662. 
 127. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542. 
 128. Id. at 533. 
 129. Id. at 541. 
 130. Id. at 539. 
 131. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). As Professor White observes, “if there was any 
doubt that the limits of a permissive Court stance toward congressional delegations had been 
reached with the Panama Refining-Schechter sequence, it disappeared with Cardozo’s 
concurrence in Schechter.” WHITE, supra note 1, at 111. 
 132. Professor Ernst tells the story of Justice Brandeis calling two of Roosevelt’s main 
lawyers, Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, and proclaiming that “[t]he President has 
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The statute, declared Hughes, provided the NIRA with a “wide 
field of legislative possibilities” in which the agency could “roam 
at will.”133 “Such a delegation of legislative power,” he wrote, “is 
unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the 
constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”134 
The Court faced one more case growing out of constitutional 
objections to the Democrats’ bold strategies with respect to the 
National Industrial Recovery Act. Congress had enacted the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in 1935,135  effectively taking the 
code for the industry written under NIRA and passing it as 
legislation. Delegation to write the code was therefore not an issue. 
The key issue confronting Congress was how to maintain decent 
wages for miners in the coal industry and also to provide a right to 
these miners to bargain collectively. In an important sense, this Act, 
and the corresponding Coal Code that emerged from the NRA after 
the statute’s enactment, was an incipient and unsuccessful bridge 
between the pro-labor strategies in the NIRA and the major effort 
to regulate labor relations in the Wagner Act, to be examined in 
depth below. As Stern notes in his extended discussion of the 
constitutional controversy, labor costs were more than 50 percent 
of the total cost of coal mine production, and so the regulation of 
wages was an important step in regulating commerce.136 But was 
this enough to pass constitutional muster?137 
The Court considered the constitutional challenge in Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co.138 The Court here, as in Schechter Poultry, evaluated 
both objections to the Act: first, that this effort to regulate intrastate 
activities—wages of workers—was beyond the scope of the 
Commerce Clause and, second, that this statute represented an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court’s tone 
 
been living in a fool’s paradise,” and warned that the administration’s future actions would 
have to be “considered most carefully in light of these decisions by a unanimous court.” 
ERNST, supra note 1, at 60. 
 133. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538. 
 134. Id. at 537. 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 801 (otherwise known as the “Guffey-Snyder” Act). 
 136. Stern, supra note 109, at 664. 
 137. Stern notes: “President Roosevelt requested Congress to pass the bill, despite 
admitted doubts as to whether the Supreme Court would uphold its constitutionality . . . .” 
Id. at 667 (citing Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in 4 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297–98 (1938)). 
 138. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936). 
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was abidingly negative; it appeared to like nothing about this 
statute. The Court equated mining with manufacturing and 
stressed the local character of the activities regulated. And none of 
the traditional exceptions to the otherwise prohibited device of 
regulating intrastate activities on the argument that they affect the 
channels and/or instrumentalities of commerce are applicable 
here. The regulation, as in Schechter Poultry, deals with a “purely 
local activity.”139 
Also fatal is the delegation of lawmaking power, and in 
particular, the delegation of power to private parties in the form of 
a National Bituminous Coal Commission. “[T]his,” says the Court, 
“is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not 
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively 
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be  
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same 
business.”140 This kind of delegation “undertakes an intolerable  
and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and  
private property.”141 
Conventional wisdom sees the flaws with the NIRA, as 
revealed in the decided cases, as stemming from the dissonance 
between legislative power and principles of legality. Public 
intellectuals, scholars, and even some of the Justices speaking in 
their extra-judicial capacities in the half century before the New 
Deal, emphasized this theme.142 Yet, the idea that these 
nondelegation doctrines follow more or less the line set out by  
A.V. Dicey in his critique of administrative discretion143 is  
overly simplistic.144 
 
 139. Id. at 304. 
 140. Id. at 311. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See ERNST, supra note 1, at 2 (“Americans’ belief that courts might deliver them 
from Tocqueville’s nightmare gave a distinctly legalistic cast to the administrate state they 
created after 1900.”); id. at 52 (noting Hughes speech in 1931 warning against 
“unscrupulous” administrators). 
 143. See generally DICEY, supra note 77. On the legalist tradition of which Dicey, 
Friedrich Hayek, and others sprung, see HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225–30. 
 144. See LANDIS, supra note 70, at 50–51 (“A principle that runs through the many 
decisions on delegation of power, however, is that the grant of the power to adjudicate must 
be bound to a stated objective which the determination of claims must tend, and, further, 
that the grant of the power to regulate must specify not only the subject matter of regulation 
but also the end which regulation seeks to attain.”). 
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A more nuanced way to understand the Court’s skepticism 
about delegation to agencies is to see that Congress had created a 
statute that did not provide the sort of standards which would 
channel administrative discretion in a direction which would best 
implement legislative objectives. Moreover, the statute gave the 
judiciary a basis to evaluate the soundness of administrative 
decision-making under relevant principles of statutory 
interpretation and administrative law. Not surprisingly, the Court 
emphasized the absence of administrative procedures, which could 
limit the discretion of agencies appropriately.145 
All was not lost, however, as the Court’s opinions, especially in 
Schechter Poultry, were not abidingly negative as they are so 
commonly painted. Indeed, the Court went so far as to provide a 
template for Congress in solving these problems. It is critically 
important that we see the Court in these delegation cases as raising 
concerns that it was confident would be properly addressed and 
solved by Congress.146 The Court in Panama Refining and Schechter 
Poultry issued what is essentially a how-to manual—a template for 
constitutional validity.147 
What were the minimal terms of this how-to manual, this quid 
pro quo? First, intelligible principles to guide administrative 
agency discretion, as the Justices made clear in these cases; and 
second, procedures which would ensure that agencies would keep 
within their lanes and would implement the objectives of  
the statute.  
 
 145. As an antidote to the view that the two lodestar cases represented a resuscitation 
of formalist separation of powers orthodoxy, White points to “a passage toward the end of 
the [Panama Refining] opinion that hinted that the simple attachment of a few procedural 
safeguards to congressional delegations might assuage the Court’s constitutional concerns.” 
WHITE, supra note 1, at 110 (citing Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935)). 
 146. Cushman points to an interesting comment from the diary of Harold Ickes, 
Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior. He says that at a dinner party, Justice Owen Roberts, 
who had voted with the majority in Panama Refining, assured him “that he is entirely 
sympathetic with what we are trying to do in the oil matter and that he hoped we would 
pass a statute that would enable us to carry out our policy.” Cushman, supra note 126, at 1936 
(quoting HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 273 (1953)). 
 147. As Cushman summarizes the impact of the 1935–36 cases, these decisions “did not 
erect insuperable obstacles to reform in these areas, but instead channeled congressional 
efforts into achieving those desired ends through means that were consistent with prevailing 
constitutional doctrine.” Id. at 1964; see also Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Consultation, 79 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 80 (1998) (describing that “the Hughes 
Court offered the Roosevelt administration a distinctive form of consultative relationship”). 
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Likewise, these procedures are important to safeguard and 
facilitate judicial interests. Courts can steer agencies toward sound 
decision-making by requiring agencies to follow processes that are 
fair and efficient; judicial-like procedures meet these criteria, and it 
is no accident that courts embrace procedures that are familiar to 
the courtroom. This is a quintessential example of the political and 
legal accommodation so instrumental to the establishment and 
maintenance of the modern administrative state. Congress gets 
what it wants by establishing a schema of regulatory 
administration that passes constitutional muster; courts give their 
blessing to statutes delegating regulatory authority to an agency 
when those statutes contain suitable procedural safeguards.148 
D. Agency Adjudication and the Judicial Function 
The critical role of the judicial function in the area of regulatory 
administration was a central theme of the Court’s decision in 
Crowell v. Benson.149 In Crowell, the Court considered whether an 
administrator could make findings of fact in disputes arising under 
the rubric of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act (LHWCA) and, further, whether these findings would be final. 
Yes, answered the Court as to both questions, so long as the 
findings were supported by evidence and within the scope of the 
administrator’s authority. Consistent with the political 
accommodation, Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court, “[t]o 
hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the 
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive 
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are 
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an 
administrative agency specially assigned to that task.”150 
Equally consistent with the political accommodation, the Court 
insisted that this authority was subject to the requirement that all 
legal questions were to be determined by an Article III court 
 
 148. Commentators at the time understood that the Court was, as White puts it, 
“providing blueprints for the creation of new agencies.” WHITE, supra note 1, at 113; see, e.g., 
Reuben Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 
(1937) (noting, with special reference to the nondelegation cases, that “the quasi-judicial or 
quasi-legislative administrative tribunal has been recognized and approved as a permanent 
instrument of government”). 
 149. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 150. Id. at 46. 
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without any deference to administrators. Moreover, courts would 
make de novo factual determinations in matters involving 
jurisprudential and constitutional facts. They would do so because 
of the essential role of the federal courts in supervising 
administrative power. Further, agency decisions would be subject 
to judicial review by an Article III court, a requirement that would 
become well embedded in the structure of federal courts 
jurisprudence in the years to follow—indeed, would become a 
mainstay of the Hart-Wechsler synthesis as described by later 
generations of federal courts scholars.151 
Crowell reflected an accommodation of philosophies and of 
interests. Tension about the expanding scope of administrative 
power was conspicuous in the period leading up to the New 
Deal,152 and even Hughes himself had expressed concern about the 
bureaucracy.153 To be sure, Congress had enacted legislation, in 
addition to the LHWCA, authorizing administrators to make 
factual determinations—to put in rather more grandiose terms, to 
exercise administrative discretion and therefore to bear the weight 
of governmental power—and yet the Court had been tepid in 
embracing this new reality of governance. In its Ben Avon ruling in 
1920,154 the Court insisted that a federal court determine de novo 
whether or not a rate was confiscatory.155 While vehemently 
criticized by New Deal architects, including Frankfurter,156 Ben 
Avon remained good law by the time the Court considered the 
matter of administrative power twelve years later in Crowell.157 In 
this light, Crowell was a resounding victory for the New Deal 
 
 151. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 939–40 (1988). 
 152. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1593 (“The proliferation of agencies in the New 
Deal placed this accommodation under substantial pressure.”). 
 153. See ERNST, supra note 1, at 43–50, 52. 
 154. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 290 (1920). For a full 
discussion of Ben Avon and its place in pre–New Deal struggles over the nature and scope of 
the administrative state, see Schiller, supra note 1, at 401–04. 
 155. For a full discussion of Ben Avon and its place in pre–New Deal struggles over the 
nature and scope of the administrative state, see Schiller, supra note 1, at 401–04. 
 156. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 464 (2d ed. 1935). 
 157. This was much to the chagrin of New Dealers. See Schiller, supra note 1, at 403 
(“For progressive proponents of the administrative state, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ben 
Avon was a nightmare come to life.”). 
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agency, seeking a balance between broad administrative discretion 
and judicial authority. 
Considered as a product of its critical time, Crowell reveals a 
judicial accommodation of myriad interests, in particular, the 
interests of Congress in creating a scheme of administrative 
governance that was, as Hughes put it, “prompt, continuous, expert 
and inexpensive,”158 and the interests of the courts in maintaining 
an adequate judicial role. Beyond this, Crowell also acknowledges 
that the key role of administrative procedure and the establishment 
of proper guardrails to the exercise of bureaucratic power. These 
procedures are an essential part of the quid pro quo for the Court’s 
constitutional imprimatur on agency power. This would become 
clearer in the run-up to the enactment of the APA and in a number 
of blockbuster administrative law cases in the seven decades 
afterward, but it is important to see Crowell through that lens.  
Chief Justice Hughes notes that the statute provides for notice 
and hearing, a hearing which is to be public, and, moreover, 
requires the administrator’s decision to be based upon the “record 
of the hearings and other proceedings” before him.159 These 
procedures are characteristic of foundational regulatory statutes of 
the Progressive Era, and the Court noted precedent that deals with 
the responsibility of agency officials to base their decisions on 
evidence in the record.160 Much is made in hindsight of the Court’s 
requirement that there be judicial review of any legal 
determinations,161 but this principle was shaky even as stated in the 
case. Yet, as Adrian Vermeule notes in his extended discussion of 
law’s abnegation in the decades following Hughes’s synthesis in 
Crowell, the requirement of judicial review would be tenuous 
without clarity about what approach courts were to take to 
examining jurisprudential and constitutional facts and, likewise, 
 
 158. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). 
 159. Id. at 48 (quoting Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 
1927 § 23(b), 44 Stat. 1424 (1927)). 
 160. Id. (citing Chi. Junction Case v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 263 (1924), United 
States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924), and Interstate Com. Comm’n v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913)). 
 161. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power 
of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 645 (2004); Fallon, supra note 151, at 916; David P. 
Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 514 
(1987); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee 
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 848–49 (1986). 
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what deference courts would pay to administrative agency 
determinations.162 The key takeaway from Crowell, however, is that 
agencies must undertake their responsibilities consistent with 
administrative procedures, procedures which generate better 
decisions and which provide information that enables Congress 
and the President to carry out their oversight responsibilities and 
other strategic objectives.163 As we show below, these uncertainties 
about proper scope of review, etc., would be settled as the evolving 
political accommodation became much clearer between 1935 with 
the passage of the NLRA and 1946 with the passage of the APA. 
The Court had embraced administrative discretion in matters of 
agency adjudication where there are suitable procedures to guide 
such discretion and where the judiciary maintained a supervisory 
role. This was the message of Crowell, a message that would be 
reaffirmed later in the New Deal as the Court considered further 
matters involving the performance of administrative functions in 
the context of agency adjudication. This accommodation by the 
Court to judicial interests in maintaining a wide swath of 
supervisory power through de novo review and strictures on 
agency decision-making even in fact finding, went down 
skeptically with New Deal progressives. For Landis and 
Frankfurter especially, they saw the Court’s decision as, at best, a 
very small step forward in the establishing of meaningful 
administrative discretion and, at worst, a betrayal of the ideals of 
the administrative state.164 
 
 162. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 29–31. Vermeule continues with an interesting 
analysis of what he calls the “collapse” of Crowell, noting the ways in which it has been at 
least thinned out, if not gutted, by a number of doctrinal developments in administrative 
law. See id. at 29–36. There is a weaker and stronger version of Vermeule’s claim. The weaker 
version is to see the courts after Crowell as moving away, if not entirely abandoning its 
commitment to independent judicial review. The journey from Crowell to Chevron could be 
viewed as the rejiggering of agency/court relations so as to deemphasize the de novo 
character of judicial review in matters of factual findings and interpretation. A stronger 
version is that the seeds of Crowell’s collapse is in Hughes’ opinion itself. It is difficult to assess 
this stronger claim without an exegesis of post-Crowell administrative law doctrine, and such 
an exegesis is beyond the scope of this article. Still and all, we would make a couple points 
relevant to this discussion. 
 163. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). 
 164. See LANDIS, supra note 70, at 134 (“The insistence that the administrative process 
in these phases must be subject to judicial review is to be explained in part, I believe,  
by economic determinism.”); see also Crowell, 285 U.S. at 94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)  
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E. Resolving the Delegation Dilemma in the Second New Deal 
The Second New Deal represents Congress and the President’s 
attempt to secure the victories won with regard to national 
economic policy and power, and also to ensure that new regulatory 
instruments would pass constitutional muster. Famously, 
President Roosevelt railed against the Court and was resolved to 
press ahead with his agenda by bold means, including the 
appointment of justices sympathetic to the New Deal; he even 
threatened to pack the Court with justices who would outnumber 
those recalcitrant to his agenda. Just as the Republicans defended 
the Court for its decisions invalidating key parts of the Democrats’ 
New Deal agenda,165 the Democratic Party made clear that it would 
persist in enacting broad national legislation to carry out its policy 
objectives. As Senator Barkley said in a speech quoting Lincoln’s 
first inaugural: 
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions, affecting 
the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation 
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased 
to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned 
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.166 
Within a short three-year period, much of the dust would have 
settled, and the Democrats’ policy agenda would be secured against 
constitutional attack. The New Deal agency would triumph. 
As we previewed our argument in the introduction, neither the 
externalist nor internalist views adequately capture the story of the 
Court’s decisions in this critical era, although both are important 
factors in the equation. To us, a central difference between the 
 
(“[S]ince the advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able to bear heavy 
expenses, the purpose of the Act will be in part defeated.”). 
 165. The Republican Party platform said The New Deal “has insisted on the passage of 
laws contrary to the Constitution” and “[t]he integrity and authority of the Supreme Court 
has been flouted.” Republican Party Platform of 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1936 (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2020). 
 166. Lincoln continued (in a Lockean line): “Nor is there in this view any assault upon 
the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly 
brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to 
political purposes.” President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm. 
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Court’s approach in the first wave of delegation cases during the 
New Deal and the second wave, exemplified particularly by Jones 
& Laughlin, is that Congress enacted a statute that met objections 
and constitutional requirements, as articulated by the majority over 
the objections of the four horsemen. Although most constitutional 
law scholars seem not to have noticed, the majority opinion in 
Panama Refining and especially Schechter Poultry gave Congress an 
explicit and detailed roadmap for how to construct a scheme of 
administrative process that would satisfy its demands. And it was 
not a coincidence that these demands were particularly focused on 
the fidelity of agencies to administrative procedures that met both 
Congress’s and the judiciary’s strategic interests and needs. 
1. Administrative politics and the origins of the NLRA 
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also 
known as the Wagner Act,167 in 1935, in part to stem a rising tide of 
industrial violence of the 1930s. The NLRA was the final step in a 
series of efforts made in the wake of NIRA-inspired unrest to 
improve and make permanent a set of institutions to foster the 
peaceful resolution of labor disputes. The new bill drew on the 
failures of the previous incarnations of the law.168 
The NLRA succeeded where prior attempts had failed because 
it went beyond earlier legislation in five ways: (1) It defined a 
number of unfair labor practices that by nature interfered with the 
meaningful enjoyment of the organizing and bargaining rights 
created in the law, imposing clear and uncontestable constraints on 
employers; (2) it provided a Board-controlled process for election 
of union representatives, effectively constraining employees as 
well; (3) it provided the NLRB with the power and independence 
necessary for effective enforcement of those constraints upon both 
workers and their employers; (4) it cleared up lines of authority so 
the president could not intervene on an ad hoc basis; and the NLRB 
did not depend, as did its predecessors, on other organizations for 
enforcement; and (5) it created a regulatory process that the 
Supreme Court held constitutional and hence legally binding on 
employers. The last two accomplishments represent part of the 
 
 167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935). 
 168. See id. 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
196 
 
basis for the development of administrative law that transforms the 
right of open access into a reality. 
To summarize our argument: the NIRA asserted various labor 
rights to organize, but failed to create an effective set of either 
administrative structures or processes to enforce them: 
• NIRA provided no clear mandate, command structure, or 
process to create rules and precedents with which to regulate 
union activity and labor-firm bargaining. For example, it failed 
to define adequately the type of acceptable organizations 
designed to represent union members and created no process 
or substance by which a firm could be found not in compliance 
with the law. 
• Unclear lines of authority created bureaucratic and 
administrative problems: The law required that the NLB rely 
on the NRA and the Department of Justice for enforcement, 
each of which had their own priorities that conflicted with 
those of the NLRB. 
• President Roosevelt intervened in ad hoc ways inconsistent 
with the NRA. 
• The constitutional status of the law and hence NLB regulations 
remained uncertain, affording employers the ability to delay 
and resist NLRB authority. 
In the face of this confusion, the absence of clear 
constitutionality, and the inability of the government to enforce the 
rules, employers resisted labor regulation at every turn. As noted, 
this disparity between promise and actuality in the context of the 
Depression generated unprecedented labor unrest. 
The NLRA resolved each of these problems. It granted the 
NLRB a substantially clearer mandate and effective structure and 
process. The Act clarified lines of authority. It also gave the Board 
the direct ability to enforce its rulings without relying on other 
organizations, including subpoena powers. By making the NLRB 
the sole legal authority in its area, the Act also removed the ability 
of the president to intervene within the agency’s jurisdiction. In 
stark contrast to the 1933 legislation, the Act was consciously 
designed to maximize the likelihood that the Supreme Court would 
find it constitutional. Finally, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of 
the NLRA’s constitutionality led to enforcement of the Act, 
employer compliance, and an end to violence associated with labor. 
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The NLRA was the culmination of several decades of legal 
innovation—innovation that is largely responsible for 
contemporary public law jurisprudence. Politics were an 
undeniable component of the eventual finding of New Deal laws as 
constitutional beginning in 1937. But the traditional account of the 
New Deal constitutional controversies over-emphasizes politics 
and under-emphasizes the role of the development of doctrine and 
the necessary inventions in the technology of administrative 
delegation. The standard wisdom is that after FDR threatened to 
pack the court, Justice Roberts made his famous “switch in time,” 
and the Justices acquiesced to his New Deal legislation. Although a 
caricature, this brief summary of the standard wisdom in 
constitutional law case books captures their essence. 
We argue that a far more complex and interesting story hides 
in legal doctrine. The NLRA was a clear and direct attempt to 
respond to concerns about the New Deal’s constitutionality as 
articulated by the Court in the early New Deal cases. By doing so, 
Congress invented new structures and processes that the Court 
would hold in Jones & Laughlin as satisfying constitutional 
restrictions. We assert that Congress and the Court engaged in a 
dialogue concerning issues of delegation, political control, 
oversight, and the means of ensuring rights of due process. By 
trying new structures and processes and having them, at times, 
struck down and, at times, upheld, Congress and the Court jointly 
created a major expansion of administrative law. 
2. To the Supreme Court 
The NLRA drafters’ attention to the New Deal precedent and 
concerted effort to address the Court’s concerns paid off. In Jones & 
Laughlin Steel v. NLRB,169 holding the Wagner Act constitutional, 
the Court acknowledged that Congress had fixed the delegation 
issue under the NIRA. After declaring that the Schechter Poultry case 
is “not controlling here,” the Court goes on to find that, 
The Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform. 
There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The Board must 
receive evidence and make findings. The findings as to the facts 
are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order 
of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only 
 
 169. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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when sustained by the court may the order be enforced. Upon that 
review all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the 
regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right 
or statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We 
construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate 
opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary action 
in accordance with the well settled rules applicable to 
administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the 
enforcement of valid legislation.170 
Furthermore, the Court declared that the Act properly defines 
and delineates the scope of the Board’s authority: 
 We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be 
construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional 
authority. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and 
invoked in this instance, is found in section 10(a) [29 U.S.C.A. 
160(a)], which provides:  
 “Sec. 10(a). The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, 
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice 
(listed in section 8 [section 158]) affecting commerce.”  
 The critical words of this provision, prescribing the limits of the 
Board’s authority in dealing with the labor practices, are “affecting 
commerce.” The act specifically defines the “commerce” to which 
it refers (section 2(6), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(6)) . . . .171  
By contrast, the NIRA (1) delegated authority without sufficient 
definition of terms or limits on authority; (2) delegated regulatory 
authority to private groups; (3) paid little attention to legal 
decisions about existing legislation with which the New Deal 
legislation interacted; and (4) made few provisions to ensure 
respect for rights of due process. Therefore, the Court ruled it 
unconstitutional. However, the Wagner Act sought to remedy these 
defects; it (1) delegated authority with sufficient definitions of 
terms and limits on authority; (2) delegated authority to the 
National Labor Relations Board, a government administrative 
agency; (3) responded to concerns expressed by the Court in 
previous New Deal cases and modeled the administrative schema 
on an existing and established agency; and (4) ensured due process 
rights through delineating the processes through which the agency 
 
 170. Id. at 41, 47. 
 171. Id. at 30–31. 
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was to exercise its authority. It learned from the Court’s previous 
decisions and when drafting the NLRA, Wagner and his writers 
placed the new agency comfortably within constitutional bounds. 
3. Jones and the interbranch dialogue 
Why did the Court seemingly move in a much more 
sympathetic direction toward the New Deal Congress’s agenda in 
Jones & Laughlin? Barry Friedman sees this turn as a sharp one, 
viewing the Court in Jones & Laughlin as “flat out overturn[ing] the 
doctrines that it previously had used to strike down New Deal 
legislation, abdicating virtually all responsibility to patrol 
economic legislation for its consistency with the Constitution.”172 
For G. Edward White, this reflects mainly a shift from separation of 
powers to Commerce Clause concerns. But this still prompts the 
question of why.173 In a somewhat similar vein, Barry Cushman 
points out the different doctrinal issues that were at play in these 
cases.174 Cushman argues that the early laws were hastily written, 
often without justification; they were poorly crafted. Further, the 
quality of the people involved was low.175 Both crafting and quality 
were much higher, he argues, for the drafting of the acts associated 
with the later New Deal cases, including the NLRA and the Social 
Security Act.176 
These suggestions point to externalist explanations for the 
difference.177 A more compelling account is that Congress had 
 
 172. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 234. 
 173. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 111–13. 
 174. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 37. 
 175. See id. 
 176. “The drafters of the Wagner Act, by contrast, framed its provisions with both eyes 
firmly fixed on contemporary constitutional doctrine.” Id. at 38. Cushman says the same 
holds for the Social Security Act. Id. 
 177. Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, provide some of the most unique evidence about the 
externalist explanation. Taking January 1937 as a dividing point, they show that Justice 
Roberts’s voting on cases before this dividing point is statistically different from his voting 
afterward. Id. at 72. As they observe, this pattern is what the traditional approach predicts—
the essence of the switch in time that saved nine. Unfortunately, their analysis has an 
assumption wired in, which, while not undermining the empirics, affects the question of 
whether the externalist explanation is the most plausible: they assume that the cases reaching 
the Supreme Court are the same before and after January 1937. This assumption builds into 
the analysis the central element of the controversy: traditionalists see cases as New Deal 
cases, as if all were alike. Cushman contests this claim, as does Ernst, albeit more equivocally. 
And, indeed, that the cases are different is the essence of the internalist claim. 
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adapted by 1937 to the Court’s directions about how best to 
configure a statute that would meet constitutional scrutiny.178 
As Katznelson surveys this dialogue between the Court and 
Congress, he remarks:  
After the Hundred Days, congressional forms of dispute, debate, 
and decision survived and thrived. . . . In all, the central place of 
Congress was maintained. Even more, the crucial lawmaking role 
that it undertook offered a practical answer to critics who thought 
the days of legislative institutions had passed.179 
Congress learned well the lessons imparted by the Supreme 
Court in the NIRA cases. As a result, the blockbuster statutes 
enacted later in the New Deal, especially the NLRA and securities 
acts,180 represented a new model of regulatory legislation. It 
synthesized the administrative and constitutional law and devised 
a means by which an agency focused on novel problems might 
accomplish a series of desired ends, including ending a century of 
violence surrounding labor organization that at times seemed 
unsolvable.181 These statutes represent a major innovation in 
regulatory administration in administrative law. What was so truly 
innovative in these statutes? Several key elements, each exemplars 
of the modern regulatory state182: 
 
Indeed, the main alternative hypothesis is the idea that the New Dealers adapted their 
legislation to the concerns of the Supreme Court, hence, as we and others argue, legislation 
was not the same across the New Deal. Furthermore, the chief moment dividing the two 
periods is the NLRA, producing the very court case of the Ho and Quinn dividing line, Jones 
& Laughlin Steel in 1937. Hence their method does not test whether the New Deal cases before 
the Supreme Court evolved in a way that made them more acceptable to a majority of  
the Court. 
 178. The connection between the Court’s “how-to” analysis and the structure of the 
NLRA, SSA, and new AAA was noticed by commentators at the time. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, 
supra note 148; Stern, supra note 109. 
 179. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 125. 
 180. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 
95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009); Barry Cushman, The Securities Laws and the Mechanics of Legal 
Change, 95 VA. L. REV. 927 (2009). 
 181. See Margaret Levi, Tania Melo, Barry R. Weingast & Frances Zlotnick, Opening 
Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Business, Government, & the National Labor Relations Act, in 
ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT 331 (Naomi Lamoreaux & 
John Wallis eds., 2017). 
 182. See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 32, at 320–21 (“[A] delegation of power [to administrative 
agencies] implies some limit [and] the availability of judicial review is, in our system and 
under our tradition, the necessary premise of legal validity.”); VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 43 
(contending that “[t]he administrative state is entirely the product of the constitutional 
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• The legislation does not delegate the choice of policy goals to 
an agency. Instead, the legislation defines the policy goals of 
the agency; the agency is to implement policies chosen by 
Congress, not delegating authority to the private sector  
nor leaving to the agency the essential prerogatives to choose 
those goals; 
• The legislation requires findings before making decisions, 
including the issuance of regulations; 
• Related to this, agency decisions must be made on the basis  
of evidence; 
• That the agency provide substantial evidence; 
• The agency can appeal only to evidence presented as part of 
the proceeding; 
• Standard procedures in circumstance in which an agency was 
developing a regulation includes (a) the announcement of a 
proposed regulation, with (b) an opportunity for interested 
persons to comment, and (c) an explanation of why this rule is 
appropriate; 
• Other requirements arose in instances when an agency sought 
a formal proceeding. 
The traditional administrative law instinct is to see these 
familiar requirements as emerging from the APA in 1946. However, 
these key elements of regulation were in fact hardwired directly 
into the later New Deal statutes; and they were reinforced in key, 
early Supreme Court decisions involving administrative decision-
making.183 The APA was not created out of whole cloth from 
nowhere; rather, it emerged from a developing body of 
 
institutions of 1789” and that administrative agencies are constrained by “relevant 
constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments”); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 939 (2011) (“American 
administrative law is grounded in a conception of the relationship between reviewing courts 
and agencies modeled on the relationship between appeals courts and trial courts in  
civil litigation.”). 
 183. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (holding that if an 
agency “action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of 
the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived 
the law”). 
3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
202 
 
administrative law and a new model of regulatory administration 
embodied in the NLRA and other later New Deal statutes.184 
F. Agencies, Adjudication, and Fidelity to Fair Procedure: The Seeds of 
the New Administrative Law 
In Crowell,185 the Supreme Court confirmed administrative 
agency power to find facts so long as these findings were supported 
by the weight of evidence. In doing so, the Court settled an 
important issue that had been in doubt after its decision in Ben 
Avon, that is, the agency’s latitude to exercise discretion. To be sure, 
this power was not unqualified. In addition to requiring that the 
decision be based on sufficient evidence, the Court demanded that 
an Article III court exercise its supervisory role by deciding 
questions of law de novo.186 
The central lesson of Crowell was reinforced in cases decided 
later in the New Deal. The Court’s opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards 
Co. v. United States (1936),187 made clear that agencies were to be 
given latitude under the rubric of the relevant statute to determine 
facts (and, here, to set rates) and, second, that courts were given the 
responsibility to make determinations about so-called 
constitutional facts. In addition, agencies should adhere to 
administrative procedures that ensured that agency decisions 
would be supported by evidence, and, so long as this happened, 
courts would give substantial weight to the agencies’ findings.188 
St. Joseph Stock Yards is an important doctrinal statement and 
one which evinces the political accommodation that the Court was 
determined to implement as the New Deal emerged through a 
steady stream of legislation.189 It elaborates on the principle so 
 
 184. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Shepherd, 
supra note 21. 
 185. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). 
 186. See id. at 27; see also VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 23–30; Mark Tushnet, The Story of 
Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (V. Jackson & J. 
Resnik eds., 2010); Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). 
 187. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). 
 188. Id. at 50–53. 
 189. In his extended discussion of the St. Joseph Stock Yards case, Mark Tushnet contrasts 
what he views as a formalistic approach to the judicial-agency relationship and the legal 
realism of Justice Louis Brandeis, as reflected in his concurring opinion here.  
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critical to the emerging administrative law that agency discretion 
must be carried out consistent with sound administrative 
procedures, procedures established by Congress and enforced by 
the courts. And, interestingly, the doctrinal statement goes a step 
further than Crowell in instructing courts to acknowledge agency 
expertise by giving significant weight to agency findings. 
In a series of cases beginning in 1936 and continuing for another 
five years, the Court considered the performance of the 
bureaucracy in the context of agricultural ratemaking. The 
principal claim in the first of the four Morgan cases, argued in 1935 
and decided in 1936, was that the Secretary of Agriculture failed to 
give the party a “full hearing.” The Court agreed that this full 
hearing must be before the Secretary, as he was the one with the 
final decision, or at least there needed to be adequate evidence that 
he had reviewed the evidence and the briefs.190 This issue continued 
into the second Morgan case, decided in 1938. There, Chief Justice 
Hughes emphasized in oral argument and in the final opinion the 
essential role of adequate administrative procedure. A hearing 
within the meaning of administrative law required that parties 
have “a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing 
party and to meet them.”191 Hughes’s opinion was a veritable brief 
in favor of maintaining “proper standards” in hearings in order to 
assure that the parties are treated fairly. 
The Morgan cases, particularly the first two, reflect a Court 
concerned to maintain reasonable agency procedures. It bears the 
 
See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1598–1602 (“Hughes’s analysis . . . looked backward to a legal 
world in which, as Brandeis put it, ‘rigid rules’ governed in an on-or-off fashion . . . .”). We 
do not see this in the same way. Hughes was negotiating an accommodation of interest both 
within his Court, a Court that had recently invalided big chunks of the NIRA and the AAA, 
and one which had before it cases, such as the Morgan cases discussed at text accompanying 
notes 190–194, and was faced with another case involving the exercising of administrative 
power. Moreover, his extended discussion of the role and function of administrative agencies 
in a comprehensive statute that gave the agency elaborate procedures to follow in order to 
support an agency decision, was functional in a way that progressive advocates of the New 
Deal agency would recognize and appreciate. Hughes recognizes, as Tushnet puts it, 
“imperfections in agencies,” along with imperfections in courts. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 
1602. In going a step further than in Crowell in acknowledging that a reviewing court would 
give weight to the agency’s view of the legal issues at stake—or, at the very least, the 
application of law to facts—Chief Justice Hughes was taking a more functional tack. What 
Tushnet views as formalism, we view as a scrupulous effort to recognize and implement an 
appropriate political accommodation. 
 190. Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936). 
 191. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). 
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strong imprint of a judiciary worried that procedural due process 
would not be met except if and insofar as agencies would follow 
the procedures spelled out in the statutes, with an interpretation 
that would implement this “fair play” notion of agency 
adjudication. As in Crowell and St. Joseph Stockyards, the Court was 
not dealing with New Deal administrative agencies. However, 
Chief Justice Hughes’s mention of “these multiplying agencies” 
made clear that he had firmly in mind the emerging functions of 
the New Deal bureaucracy.192 The Court was effective in preserving 
its own significant prerogatives, not only with respect to judicial 
review of agency findings of jurisdictional and constitutional fact 
but also ensuring that agencies were meeting, as Hughes put it, 
“those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the 
essence of due process.”193 The Court’s view of due process 
permeated throughout much of the national governmental 
policymaking process, not just agencies that would, a decade later, 
become subject to the APA. Ernst summarizes well the political 
accommodation underlying the Court’s approach when he writes: 
“Americans decided they could avoid Tocqueville’s nightmare if 
administration approximated the structure, procedures, and logic 
of the judiciary.”194 
These cases receive attention by administrative law scholars as 
important examples of the Court’s acceptance of administrative 
agency authority in adjudication and, with it, the steady 
displacement of the judiciary-centric, common law quality of 
administrative decision-making championed by Freund, 
Frankfurter, Landis, and others.195 Yet, few see these cases as critical 
to New Deal constitutionalism or as part of an omnibus, purposive 
approach of the Supreme Court. We do see these cases as fitting 
into the general story of political and legal accommodation. 
Specifically, the Court was willing to permit agencies to function 
 
 192. Id. at 22. 
 193. Id. at 19. 
 194. ERNST, supra note 1, at 5. These decisions involving agency decision-making 
illustrate well the political accommodation accomplished by the Supreme Court during this 
critical New Deal period. As Professor Ernst describes it: “Judicializing administrative 
procedure also addressed the interests of two vitally interested groups. Lawyers found that 
expertise acquired in courts remained valuable in the new administrative state. Professional 
politicians realized that due process kept executives from using administrative decisions as 
their own form of individually targeted patronage.” Id. at 142. 
 195. See generally Vermeule, supra note 2. 
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with broad powers so long as Congress had placed sufficient 
bounds on the delegation, the agencies were acting consistent with 
the terms of legislative delegation, and the procedures provided by 
Congress were adequate to keep agencies within their proper 
lanes.196 Hughes, writing for the Court in the Morgan cases, 
emphasized the importance of fair play; and in Crowell and St. 
Joseph Stockyards, he noted the value of expertise, exercised in 
accordance with procedures that were conspicuously court-like 
(“hearings,” “evidence”). Viewed against the background of the 
seminal early New Deal delegation cases, including Panama 
Refining, Schechter Poultry, and Carter Coal, these administrative 
adjudication decisions illustrate the Court’s embrace of 
congressional objectives, objectives which included widening the 
sphere of administrative power and discretion, so long as agencies 
had standards to guide their discretion and appropriate procedures 
to maintain fair process and fidelity to the rule of law.  
Equally, elected officials embraced the procedural standards 
advocated by the courts as part of the price of constitutional 
sanction of New Deal legislation. 
The Court’s insistence on fair play and due process norms also 
animated its decision in Chenery,197 decided in 1943. In Chenery, the 
Court considered an order of the SEC under the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935.198 The Court read this statute, and 
the administrative process that it constructed, as requiring the 
agency to base its order on the grounds upon which the record 
discloses that the agency’s action was based.199 This was required, 
announced Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the Court, by “the 
orderly functioning of the process of review.”200 The problem here 
was not at all with the nature and scope of the agency’s powers—
as Frankfurter puts it, “we are not imposing any trammels on [the 
agency’s] powers”—but with the exercise of administrative 
 
 196. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 976, 987 (1982) (“The principal concern of administrative law since the New Deal, in 
short, has been to develop surrogate safeguards for the original protection afforded by 
separation of powers and electoral accountability.”). 
 197. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
 198. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 5, 49 Stat. 803, repealed by Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 594. 
 199. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94–95. 
 200. Id. at 94. 
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discretion and, more to the point, by the agency’s failure to engage 
in appropriate procedures.201 
In the second Chenery case, decided four years later, the Court 
went to some length to make clear that agencies’ discretion and 
prerogative was to be safeguarded by the Court.202 In a holding that 
would become blackletter administrative law, the Court said that 
the agency could proceed through an ad hoc (adjudicatory) 
decision rather than a general rule.203 And this judgment, Justice 
Murphy concluded in his opinion for the Court, “is the product of 
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the 
problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible 
treatment of the uncontested facts.”204 It is, in short, an example of 
a judgment that “justifies the use of the administrative process.”205 
In essence, the Court in Crowell and cases decided in the years 
afterward was providing a how-to manual for administrative 
agencies,206 this in parallel with its how-to manual for Congress to 
follow in establishing the appropriate delegation of administrative 
authority. Both elements are important, for they make clear what 
the Court expects from administrative governance, one focused 
carefully on choices made by Congress in statutory enactments  
and the other focused on Congress also, but in the context of  
agency decisions and the requirements they must meet to 
withstand scrutiny. 
 
 201. Id. at 95. 
 202. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 203. Id. at 199–200. 
 204. Id. at 209. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Professor Kevin Stack insists that Chenery II can best be understood as a decision 
whose linchpin―that is, the requirement that agencies engage in reasoned decision-
making―is connected to the conditions for a suitable delegation under the Court’s 
nondelegation doctrine. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE 
L.J. 952, 981–92 (2007) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine provides a basis for courts to read the 
Chenery principle, at least as a default rule of statutory construction, into delegations of 
authority to act with the force of law.”). We agree with Professor Vermeule that this stretches 
the analogy between a constitutional doctrine dealing with legislative power and an edict 
about fair and reasonable administrative power, an edict not grounded in constitutional 
rules. See VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 199. Nonetheless, the basic logic behind these two 
doctrines have this in common: they are designed to limit the scope of agency discretion and 
therefore navigate between a strong Progressive vision of agency independence on the one 
hand and a more circumscribed function for agencies on the other. In this respect, they 
illustrate well the political and legal accommodation reached during this key area in 
American regulatory history. 
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It is important, too, to see the way in which these holdings 
provided a doctrinal diving board of sorts for a vision of 
administrative agency deference, one that would take hold in the 
years following Crowell207 and after the enactment of the APA in 
1946.208 In his analysis of the administrative state evolving after 
Crowell, Vermeule sees this as an inevitable part of the arc toward 
deference, one whose seeds were planted in Crowell’s unstable 
compromise between authority and restriction, between a robust 
role for agencies and a protective role of courts.209 In a chapter 
section labeled “The Collapse of Crowell,” Vermeule notes the ways 
in which the Court’s insistence on a strong judicial role, and the rest 
of what he calls the Hughes synthesis, has been abandoned.210 
While there is much wisdom in these claims, it is too forward-
looking in that it takes a number of major post–New Deal 
developments, including the Court’s major decisions in Chevron v. 
Natural Resource Defense Council211 a half century later and the 
expanded use of administrative rulemaking in the 1960s and 
thereafter, as evidence that the citadel was shaky at its origin. In 
contrast, viewed in the context of the problem needing to be solved 
in the New Deal period and the decade afterward, the cases 
beginning with Crowell and continuing through St. Joseph 
Stockyards, Chenery, the Morgan cases, the agency statutory 
interpretation cases including Skidmore,212 Gray,213 and Hearst,214 
and even Universal Camera, decided five years after the enactment 
of the APA, are examples of a Court grappling with administrative 
 
 207. This period after 1937, with its settlement of the major conflicts over congressional 
and administrative power, and before the 1960s, when social regulation and new 
administrative governance came to the center of the stage, has been somewhat neglected by 
scholars. Important recent work that trains a studied spotlight on administrative 
constitutionalism and administrative law in this post–New Deal period includes JOANNA 
GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE 
NEW DEAL (2014); Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law 
and Administration in Postwar America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 415 (2008). For broader historical 
analyses of the period, see, for example, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 
20TH CENTURY (2002); KALMAN, supra note 2. 
 208. See McNollgast, supra note 184. 
 209. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 24–37. 
 210. Id. at 34. 
 211. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 212. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 213. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). 
 214. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
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power and with the concern that agencies with wide decision-
making discretion would result in poor, unfair administrative 
action. This synthesis emerging from Crowell was indeed 
influential, and, at least for a time, reflected well the balance struck 
by the Court in the area of regulatory administration. 
To be sure, this balance would be tested in the years after the 
APA’s enactment. The history of modern administrative law, 
defining modern to include the eighty years after the New Deal and 
this judicial imprimatur on administrative power, reveals this 
tension in a myriad of decisions and their consequences. In future 
work, we will examine these developments. Spoiler alert: much of 
this jurisprudence illustrates the continuing judicial-legislative 
dialogue and the importance of accommodating the interests and 
objectives of both branches.215 
The Court’s holdings in these two clusters of constitutional 
cases, one involving nondelegation and the other involving the 
proper scope of agency adjudication, not only effectuate a political 
accommodation which ensures the viability and vitality of the New 
Deal administrative state, but they also presage decades of 
administrative law. The administrative law which emerges from 
the New Deal, and is reflected in lodestar cases such as Crowell, the 
Morgan cases, and Chenery, points to a new, important dialogue 
between the federal courts and administrative agencies. This 
dialogue carries forward the project of tethering the bureaucracy to 
the rule of law and to congressional policy, all the more so as 
circumstances changed over the post WWII era. The enactment of 
the APA, coming just a decade after Roosevelt’s reelection and the 
Second New Deal, reveals this promise; and so, too, does a series of 
critically important early administrative law cases, such as Skidmore 
v. Swift and Universal Camera. We leave to future work a close 
examination of how these strands of administrative law grow out 
of this New Deal political accommodation. 
G. An Accommodation of Interests 
By way of summary, we have considered in context how and 
why Congress sought to meet its three key objectives, that is, 
 
 215. See generally GRISINGER, supra note 207; Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered 
Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
1699, 1733–44 (2019). 
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exercising broader national power to deal with the imperative  
of market integration, delegating policy implementation to 
regulatory agencies in order to carry out a legislative mission, and, 
finally, designing appropriate regulatory instruments to ensure 
that agencies would implement congressional policy choices that 
would stick. 
We see a dialogue and bargaining between the Supreme Court 
and political officials over the technology of administration. The 
early New Deal legislation was hastily written and paid 
inadequate—indeed, in some cases, no—attention to designing 
agencies in a manner consistent with previous constitutional 
rulings by the Supreme Court. Consistent with both this view and 
the traditional scholarly view, the Supreme Court rejected many of 
these laws, including the flagship NIRA. But the Supreme Court 
further outlined not just the defects in the inadequate structure and 
process of the legislation, it also explained the structure and process 
necessary for regulatory laws to be constitutional. These cases led 
New Dealers to search for commonalities in the successful 
regulatory legislation delegating power to agencies.216 
 
 216. There is a way to put this thesis in more conventionally PPT terms. The logic is as 
follows: The conventional approaches to these issues fails to make the key distinction 
between the coalition on the Court against the New Deal and the pivot. It may well be that 
the four horsemen on the Court were so abidingly hostile to the New Deal that no legislation 
delegating authority to agencies would satisfy them. In particular, despite the how-to aspects 
of the key anti–New Deal decisions, they would not support legislation reflecting those 
principles. But, as non-pivotal coalition members in a 5-4 environment, their views do not 
matter. Instead, the key is Roberts as the universally acknowledged swing voter. As swing 
voter, the critical decisions in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were likely to reflect  
his views. 
This view implies that, were Congress to pass legislation consistent with the how-to 
strictures, a decisive majority of 5-4 (Hughes and Roberts plus the three dissenters in the 
anti–New Deal cases) would approve the legislation. This is exactly what happened in Jones 
& Laughlin Steel. The majority approving the NLRA in 1935 has generally been interpreted 
through the lens of the political story and its emphasis on the “switch in time.” Doubtless 
this account has important insights into the Supreme Court’s treatment of New Deal 
legislation beginning in January of 1937, especially with respect to the Commerce Clause, 
which the four horsemen took as a strict, binding constraint on congressional legislation. 
Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this holds with respect to the decision about the NLRA, 
which follows the blueprint and hence the Court’s—read, pivotal coalition members, Justices 
Hughes and Roberts’s—implicit bargaining offer to accept legislation that followed the 
blueprint. As Cushman suggests, the issues before the Court, Justices Hughes and Roberts 
in particular, in 1937 in Jones & Laughlin Steel materially differed from those facing  
Roberts and the Court in 1935 in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. Cushman, supra  
note 1, at 37–38. 
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Recalling the standard narratives of constitutional law in this 
era, the traditional externalist account of the New Deal–era stresses 
Congress’s interests (along with the President’s) and sees the story 
as one of the Liberal Democratic agenda pushed by the President 
and Congress vanquishing their foes thanks to threats of court-
packing and impactful carrots and sticks. So, naturally, this theory 
focuses on the Congress side of the ledger and sees the matter as 
one of conquest rather than accommodation. The externalist 
perspective also sees the constitutional controversy as a zero-sum 
game with only one winner: the recalcitrant Court or FDR and the 
New Deal. This assumption then structures the case-by-case 
analysis trying to read each new case, beginning with Blaisdell217 
and Nebbia,218 as evidence for the Court’s ultimate judgment. The 
internalist perspective dwells principally on the courts and sees the 
matter as one of the Supreme Court sticking to its doctrinal guns 
and crafting constitutional rules which first restrict and then later 
empower Congress to carry out its regulatory in the form designed 
by the political branches. Viewed in this light, the only real 
accommodation is Congress’s to the courts, that is, the imperative 
that Congress have fidelity to legal doctrine, doctrine decided by 
judges more or less following The Law. 
Revisionists, such as Cushman, Ernst, and White, point in a 
different direction, much of which is guided by the internalist 
direction: the nature of legislation and doctrine produced by the 
New Deal evolved in a manner sought by the courts. 
By contrast to these narratives, and building on the revisionists’ 
observations, we argue that Congress and the courts worked 
purposively to reach an accommodation of interests and of 
strategies, one which would ensure that Congress could implement 
its objectives consistent with the needs of this emerging national 
economy while likewise ensuring the judiciary’s interests would be 
ensured. Significantly, both institutions achieved a major portion of 
their goals over the course of FDR’s first term in initiating the 
accommodation (counting the Jones & Laughlin Steel in January of 
1937 as technically still part of FDR’s first term, which then ended 
in March of 1937). Congress succeeded in creating novel, workable 
regulatory instruments, ones that would enable its legislative 
 
 217. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 218. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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objectives to flourish. Moreover, they well understood that the 
processes of regulatory administration and the performance of 
agencies would be an iterative process and that strategies of 
oversight and control would be dynamic and remain so. 
In our view, the constitutional controversy was not a zero-sum 
game, but positive sum. Led by the Supreme Court, the judiciary 
got what it wanted in two important respects: First, the justices 
succeeded in creating a template for proper delegation through a 
how-to manual of sorts. Our discussion above of the NIRA and 
NLRA cases examined this template in detail. And, second, the 
Justices were able to create a politically acceptable rubric for 
checking and balancing administrative and legislative power and 
also ensuring that judicial power and prerogative would be 
respected, this through the imaginative configuration of a new 
administrative law. Indeed, administrative law is the neglected part 
of this big story of the New Deal synthesis. The Court made clear 
in a number of cases during and soon after the New Deal that 
agency decision-making would need to follow guidelines of 
procedural regularity and rationality. True, the contours of these 
requirements would be worked out over the course of the next four 
decades of administrative law, culminating in key “hard look” era 
cases of the 1970s and 80s.219 But the New Deal–era cases were 
critical in forging a scheme of delegation, regulatory discretion, and 
judicial control. 
The success of the courts in fashioning the process and limits on 
the administrative process did not come at the expense of Congress 
and the President, as the zero-sum traditional externalist 
perspective holds. Instead, Congress—especially in drafting the 
NLRA—demonstrated that it could create a powerful new 
regulatory agency to achieve desired political ends in an 
administrative system allowing congressional, not judicial, 
determination of policy ends. 
With respect to the commerce power under the Constitution, 
we see how the Court, in cases such as the railroad labor cases  
of the 1920s, created a doctrine which established the conditions 
under which Congress could press forward with key efforts  
to improve market integration and limit the states’ ability to 
 
 219. See generally EDLEY, supra note 108 (describing “hard look”-era cases). 
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balkanize commerce.220 In these developments, the Court acted as 
a partner with Congress to facilitate a measured response to a 
predicament of pre–New Deal federalism. At nearly the same time, 
however, the Court expressed consternation with how Congress 
was treating businesses affected by strong regulatory authority. In 
Ben Avon, the Court invoked a rationale that presaged the logic of 
its administrative adjudication decisions and, in particular, the 
Court’s concern that fundamental fairness and a modicum of due 
process be maintained where agencies asserted power and affected 
private economic interest.221 The point here is not to valorize these 
cases from the 1920s, but instead to see them through a positive 
political theory lens as efforts by the Court to empower Congress 
while also establishing limits on the tactics and techniques used by 
Congress to guide agency decision-making. 
We see from the Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause how 
Congress adapted in developing new regulatory legislation. And, 
likewise, we see how Congress developed regulatory structures 
and procedures to meet the Court’s concerns with adjudicatory 
fairness and administrative discretion. Much of the dynamic work 
of both Congress and the courts during this era could be 
characterized as experimental; that is, Congress was trying out new 
strategies and the Court was developing new doctrines. Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence gets a spotlight in the New Deal and post–
New Deal era as the Court decides lodestar cases establishing a 
structure that shapes and importantly broadens national power to 
deal with a specialized and increasingly integrated economy. From 
the heyday of the Progressive Era, and its creation of the first major 
national regulatory agencies, and through the initial depths of the 
Depression and up to the New Deal, the Court had been fashioning 
doctrine about regulation. Yet, constitutional law scholars too  
often neglect the doctrine in the modern constitutional canon,  
even though it is critically important in understanding these 
experiments and how the two branches shape the interests of  
each other. 
We should not lose sight of the big picture. All three branches 
of the national government were working through difficult matters 
 
 220. This state holds in particular for railway labor legislation, including the National 
Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456, and the Railway Labor Act of 
1926, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577. 
 221. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 290–91 (1920). 
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of constitutional theory. The issues were political, to be sure, but 
the struggle was not purely about politics. Legislators and judges, 
in order to develop structures and strategies that would take root, 
needed to figure out the proper place of regulatory administration 
in a scheme of constitutional government that insisted upon the 
separation of powers and worried about administrative 
discretion—in its rationale, its shape, and ultimately its impact on 
the well-being of individuals and industry. The fundamental 
challenge was how to square new technologies of governance with 
our embedded commitment to the rule of law and democracy. And 
the mounting of this challenge required a dynamic interaction 
between two critically important, and also willful, institutions of 
the national government. 
We view these key political episodes, unfolding over the course 
of a dozen years or so, from the beginning of the New Deal and up 
to the enactment of the APA, as revealing a significant 
accommodation—a political accommodation—between these two 
branches of government. The trials and tribulations of Congress 
and the Court during this tough period of American regulatory 
history yielded an accommodation—in game theoretic terms, an 
equilibrium—that ensured that the New Deal agency and the 
modern administrative state would become more or less 
entrenched. Moreover, it would be, at least from the perspective of 
Congress and the courts, successful, meaning it allowed the 
Congress and the President to meet the demands of a complex, 
integrated economy, as they saw it, and also the demands of 
fairness and rationality in administrative agency decision-making 
and therefore one embodiment of the rule of law extended to cover 
agency policymaking. 
CONCLUSION 
“[T]he American administrative state has been  
neither Tocqueville’s nightmare nor Vedder’s Good 
Administration. Its twentieth-century creators did not let 
the risk of misgovernment keep them from expanding the 
state to make life better, and they were not fooled by a vision 
of apolitical expertise into thinking that government would 
control itself. Instead, working under the particular 
political and professional conditions of their day, they 
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imaginatively reworked the law they had to create the 
government they needed.”222 
The New Deal agency resulted from deliberate political 
strategy, negotiation, and accommodation between elected officials 
and the Supreme Court. It is the product of a complex process that 
involves key decisions by purposive legislators, a determined 
president, and attentive federal judges. Each of these players acted 
within and through a constitutional framework, including an 
architecture forged by text, by doctrine, and by institutions that 
enable and constrain political choice. Too, these officials were 
embedded in a legal structure, one which consists of barriers made 
by not only parchment, but by widely shared and understood legal 
norms and principles. 
On FDR’s election, neither the shape nor the foundation of the 
regulatory state was at all clear. This moment was the dawn of 
administrative law; the APA was many years away still, and its 
contents were hard to conceive in any meaningful detail in early 
1933. The Great Depression and the failures of the laissez-faire 
capitalism to deal with myriad economic, health, and safety issues 
forced the president, members of Congress, and also the judiciary 
to confront a wide range of new regulatory problems for which no 
adequate administrative structures or principles existed. To be 
sure, administrative agencies existed—indeed, the quintessential 
federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
was a half century old by the time of the New Deal, and the Federal 
Trade Commission was two decades old. However, the architecture 
of regulatory administration was fairly crude, and the existential 
dilemma of how best to cabin administrative discretion without 
sacrificing the advantages of the bureaucracy remained elusive. 
Moreover, the role and function of the courts remained in tension 
with the New Deal agency model. Administrative agencies were 
becoming a vital, and steadily enduring, feature of American 
political life. Yet, there were key issues that remained to be 
resolved. And the resolution of these issues would require 
participation—and, ultimately, collaboration—by all three 
branches of the federal government. 
The New Deal agency did not emerge from the head of Zeus, 
and it did not gain traction through the unmediated efforts of legal 
 
 222. ERNST, supra note 1, at 146. 
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scholars who championed broad administrative agency discretion 
during the New Deal period. Rather, it was constructed by 
purposive governmental officials, each working to protect their 
own political interests and developing strategies which would 
ensure that their goals would be achievable. These efforts yielded a 
political accommodation that got important regulatory statutes first 
through Congress and then through the courts. This process was 
messy and turbulent. Some of the most important legislation of the 
famous first One Hundred Days—notably, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933223—cannot be viewed as anything but 
a wholly unsatisfactorily model foundation and constitutional 
administrative statute.224 
Understanding this political accommodation during this key 
constitutional epoch requires that we understand both the shape of 
regulatory administration and the impact of law and legal doctrine. 
The New Deal constitutional controversies were not a zero-sum 
game in which, as has been insisted upon by many scholars, the 
Supreme Court caved in 1937 to political pressure. Instead, the New 
Deal’s success reflected the invention of administrative law that 
satisfied the Supreme Court as to the constitutional requirements 
of due process while allowing adequate political and policy 
flexibility for elected officials. With this political accommodation, 
the elected branches retained control over policy; and the courts 
retained control over the requirements of due process and decision-
making consistent with the rule of law. (For the purposes of our 
analysis here, we express no opinion about the benefits or costs of 
this judicial strategy). This political accommodation portends 
struggles in the post-new Deal period, struggles which ultimately 
define concretely the modern place of agencies and administrative 
discretion in a complex republic, a republic simultaneously 
committed to effective social and economic policy and to the  
rule of law. 
 
 223. The National Industrial Recovery Act was the most far reaching of the several 
initiatives crafted quickly by the 80th Congress in this First Hundred Days. Indeed, Roosevelt 
stated that “[h]istory will probably record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most 
important and far-reaching Legislation ever created by the American Congress.” NATHAN 
MILLER, F.D.R.: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 318 (1991). 
 224. See, e.g., KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 8 (explaining that during the New Deal  
era, “[n]o decisions could be made that were not influenced by practical and  
moral compromise”). 
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We know that the story does not end with Jones & Laughlin Steel 
and, a decade later, the enactment of the APA. Agencies acted in 
important ways in the next several decades. Some of these actions 
reveal the ways in which administrative officials push the envelope 
of congressional choice. So, for example, James Landis expresses 
doubts by the beginning of the 1960s, manifest in his famous report 
to President Kennedy, about how agencies are functioning.225 Early 
public choice theory alerts us to the interest group-fueled wealth 
transfers and “budget maximizing” bureaus. Congress responds in 
large part to these actions by enacting more prolix statutes, statutes 
which create even more elaborate procedures to guide agency 
decision-making within their jurisdiction. But struggles persist 
about how best to negotiate among willful agencies, political 
brokers, and legal standards.226 The courts get into this struggle in 
earnest in the 1960s and 1970s under their APA authority to review 
informal rulemaking (by then the modal device for making 
regulatory policy). The focus shifts from the Supreme Court, which, 
save for a few key interventions (e.g., Overton Park,227 State Farm,228 
Vermont Yankee,229 Chevron230), leaves the lion’s share of the matters 
governing administrative action to the lower federal courts. In later 
work, we will look at these developments, and also some of the 
leading scholarly works on the emergence and evolution of modern 
administrative law, arriving at a conclusion consistent with our 
basic thesis, and that is that Congress and the courts reach a 
political accommodation among competing interests. 
 
 
 225. See the extended discussion in THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 
206–08 (1984). 
 226. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,  
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
 227. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 228. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 229. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 230. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
